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OverviewFar from being the sole mode of explaining, explanation in terms of – mostly probabilistic – causes has nourished a wide debate addressing diseases, what produces them and how. Focusing on causal explanations involves, in turn, getting deeper into conceptions of causation, modelling, and control, and presents a range of relevant issues for research and clinical contexts. The aim of the volume is two-fold. In the first place, its purpose is to stress core features, differences and interactions between various theories belonging to, on the one hand, the mechanical and neo-mechanical approach to explanation, and, on the other hand, the interventionist approach, testing their suitability in medicine. In the second place, and related to the first, a form of pluralism is advocated which is grounded on a deep analysis of specific features of explanatory contexts in the health sciences, especially in cancer and mental health studies. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Raffaella CampanerPublisher: Mimesis International Imprint: Mimesis International ISBN: 9788869772788ISBN 10: 8869772780 Pages: 232 Publication Date: 01 April 2020 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print  This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of ContentsCh. 1 Introduction. Scientific explanation: theoretical issues and practical implications 1.1. Explananda, explanantia, and explanatory relations 1.2 Scientific explanation and explaining disease 1.3 Causal explanation, and related issues Ch. 2 Varieties of pluralism, and why they matter 2.1 What kind of pluralists are we, and why? 2.2 Philosophical pluralistic approaches and the health sciences Ch. 3 Productive causes and mechanistic explanations 3.1 Mechanisms and mechanistic explanations 3.2 Mechanisms and the new mechanical philosophy : what's new? 3.3 Mechanistic evidence and disease mechanisms Ch. 4 From processes to mechanisms, and back 4.1 Processual approaches 4.2 Processes and molecular pathways Ch. 5 Mechanisms as explananda 5.1 Mechanisms, mechanistic models, and their boundaries 5.2 An example: the case of ADHD 5.3 What are we explaining? Ch. 6 Invariance and interventions 6.1 Causality, invariance and intervention: Woodward's way to manipulationist causation 6.2 Interventionist counterfactuals Ch. 7 Interventionist explanations in the health sciences 7.1 Interventions and difference-makers in biology and medicine 7.2. Interventionism: reflections from the standpoint of the mental health sciences Ch. 8 Manipulationist causation and interventional evidence 8.1Gillies' action-related theory of causality 8.2 Causative agents of rare diseases: the case of LGMD1F 8.3 Interventions and/or actions? Ch. 9 Non-causal counterfactual explanations 9.1 A counterfactual theory of causal explanation and a counterfactual theory of non-causal explanation: on Woodward's 9.2. Counterfactual dependence, metaphysical stances and hypothetical interventions Ch. 10 A defense of a qualified pluralism 10.1 For a qualified tidy pluralism 10.2 Final remarks: Who is being pluralist?ReviewsAuthor InformationRaffaella Campaner is Associate Professor of Philosophy of Science at the Univ. of Bologna (since 2015), and Life Member of Clare Hall College, Univ. of Cambridge (since 2019). She has extensively worked on scientific explanation and causation, both in general philosophy of science and in philosophy of medicine. Among the volumes she authored, Spiegazioni e cause in medicina: un'indagine epistemologica (2005) and Philosophy of Medicine. Causality, Evidence and Explanation (2012). Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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