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OverviewWhat is the difference between judging someone to be good and judging them to be kind? Both judgements are typically positive, but the latter seems to offer more description of the person: we get a more specific sense of what they are like. Very general evaluative concepts (such as good, bad, right and wrong) are referred to as thin concepts, whilst more specific ones (including brave, rude, gracious, wicked, sympathetic, and mean) are termed thick concepts. In this volume, an international team of experts addresses the questions that this distinction opens up. How do the descriptive and evaluative functions or elements of thick concepts combine with each other? Are these functions or elements separable in the first place? Is there a sharp division between thin and thick concepts? Can we mark interesting further distinctions between how thick ethical concepts work and how other thick concepts work, such as those found in aesthetics and epistemology? How, if at all, are thick concepts related to reasons and action? These questions, and others, touch on some of the deepest philosophical issues about the evaluative and normative. They force us to think hard about the place of the evaluative in a (seemingly) nonevaluative world, and raise fascinating issues about how language works. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Simon Kirchin (University of Kent)Publisher: Oxford University Press Imprint: Oxford University Press Dimensions: Width: 16.20cm , Height: 2.00cm , Length: 24.10cm Weight: 0.532kg ISBN: 9780199672349ISBN 10: 0199672342 Pages: 248 Publication Date: 25 April 2013 Audience: College/higher education , Undergraduate , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of Contents1: Simon Kirchin: Introduction: Thick and Thin Concepts 2: Edward Harcourt and Alan Thomas: Thick Concepts, Analysis, and Reductionism 3: Jonathan Dancy: Practical Concepts 4: Simon Kirchin: Thick Concepts and Thick Descriptions 5: Debbie Roberts: It's Evaluation, only Thicker 6: Michael Smith: On the Nature and Significance of the Distinction between Thick and Thin Ethical Concepts 7: Simon Blackburn: Disentangling Disentangling 8: Pekka Vayrynen: Thick Concepts and Underdetermination 9: Matti Eklund: Evaluative Language and Evaluative Reality 10: Timothy Chappell: There are no Thin Concepts 11: Nick Zangwill: Moral Metaphor and Thick Concepts: what Moral Philosophy can Learn from Aesthetics 12: Eric Wiland: Williams on Thick Ethical Concepts and Reasons for Action 13: Valerie Tiberius: Well-being, Wisdom, and Thick Theorizing: on the Division of Labor between Moral Philosophy and Positive Psychology IndexReviewsSimon Kirchin's Thick Concepts is a very welcome addition to the literature. Christopher Cowie, The Times Literary Supplement Simon Kirchin's Thick Concepts is a very welcome addition to the literature. Christopher Cowie, The Times Literary Supplement The contributions are varied, combative and intellectually high class. Edward Skidelsky, Philosophical Quarterly Author InformationSimon Kirchin is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Kent. He is the author of Metaethics (Palgrave, 2012), and the editor of Arguing about Metaethics (with Andrew Fisher; Routledge, 2006), and A World without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory (with Richard Joyce' Springer, 2009). He is currently writing a book about thick and thin concepts. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |