Overview

In order to survive as a social institution a firm needs a constitutional social contract, even though implicit, among its stakeholders. This social contract must exist if an institution is to be justified. The book focuses on two main issues: To find out the terms of the hypothetical agreement among the firm's stakeholders in an ex ante perspective and to understand the endogenous mechanism generating appropriate incentives that induce to comply with the social contract itself, as seen in the ex post perspective.

Full Product Details

Author:   Lorenzo Sacconi ,  L. Sacconi
Publisher:   Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG
Imprint:   Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
Edition:   Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2000
Dimensions:   Width: 15.50cm , Height: 1.30cm , Length: 23.50cm
Weight:   0.391kg
ISBN:  

9783642631351

ISBN 10:   3642631355
Pages:   229
Publication Date:   07 November 2012
Audience:   Professional and scholarly ,  Professional & Vocational
Format:   Paperback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   Manufactured on demand  
We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier.

Table of Contents

1 An Overview of the Theory: Hierarchies, Social Contract and Reputation.- 2 Economic Theory and the Social Contract of the Firm.- 3 Games of Reputation and Compliance with the Social Contract.- 4 How Far Does Reputation Extend? Abuse of Authority and Corporate Culture.- 5 Information, Incomplete Contracts and the Ethical Code.- 6 Dealing with Vagueness of Norms: the Theory of Fuzzy Sets.- 7 A Game Theoretic Model of Incomplete Contract and Ethical Code.- 8 Ethical Decision-making Procedure: Vagueness, Default Reasoning and Reputation.- References.- Names Index.

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