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OverviewThis volume examines the psychological basis of moral judgments and asks what theories of concepts apply to moral concepts. By combining philosophical reasoning and empirical insights from the fields of moral psychology, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and neuroscience, it considers what mental states not only influence, but also constitute our moral concepts and judgments. On this basis, Park proposes a novel pluralistic theory of moral concepts which includes three different cognitive structures and emotions. Thus, our moral judgments are shown to be a hybrid that express both cognitive and conative states. In part through analysis of new empirical data on moral semantic intuitions, gathered via cross-cultural experimental research, Park reveals that the referents of individuals’ moral judgments and concepts vary across time, contexts, and groups. On this basis, he contends for moral relativism, where moral judgments cannot be universally true across time and location but only relative to groups. This powerfully argued text will be of interest to researchers, academics, and educators with an interest in cognitive science, moral theory, philosophy of psychology, and moral psychology more broadly. Those interested in ethics, applied social psychology, and moral development will also benefit from the volume. Full Product DetailsAuthor: John Park (California State University, USA)Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd Imprint: Routledge Weight: 0.612kg ISBN: 9780367740764ISBN 10: 0367740761 Pages: 362 Publication Date: 09 January 2023 Audience: College/higher education , Tertiary & Higher Education Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print  This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of ContentsPart I: The Constitution Project Chapter 1: The Groundwork for Theories of Moral Concepts Chapter 2: Concerning Human Understanding Chapter 3: From Causal Studies in Moral Psychology to Moral Concepts Chapter 4: The Prototype, Exemplar, and Classical Views Chapter 5: The Theory View Chapter 6: Moral Nativism & Evolutionary Ethics Chapter 7: The Conative View & the Moral/Conventional Task Chapter 8: The Conative View Established Chapter 9: Induction & Concept Combination Chapter 10: Cognitivism/Non-Cognitivism & Motivational Judgment Internalism/Externalism Part II: The Semantic Project and Moral Relativism Chapter 11: Moral Semantic Relativism Chapter 12: Moral Relativism Chapter 13: Moral Ontological RelativismReviewsAuthor InformationJohn J. Park is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at California State University, USA Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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