Overview

Contributing to the literature on democratic transitions and with a focus on institutional bargaining, in this fascinating book the Hungarian case is contrasted with those of Poland, South Africa and China to explore the contours of what bargaining strategies affect outcomes. The result is an increased understanding of how actors and their interaction can make peaceful transition possible.

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9781349532735

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Reviews

The collapse of the Communist regimes after 1989, the closing of a long historical parenthesis, was a momentous event. In this study of the Hungarian transition John Schiemann offers the first analytical account of one of these processes, with wide implications for transitions more generally. In a compelling picture of bargaining under uncertainty, he shows how differing attitudes to risk rather than conflicting political demands generated the dynamics of the transition. It is a book that should be obligatory reading for students of regime change, who too easily come to see as inevitable what for the actors themselves was a highly contingent set of events. The Hungarian communists may have been moribund, but the world did not know it until they were dead. - Jon Elster, Robert K. Merton Professor of Social Science, Columbia University 'This highly original study adds greatly to our knowledge of pact-making and political bargaining by forcing us to think beyond the categoriess of 'regime' and 'opposition' and recognize that the role of risk-takers and risk-avoiders within each category is pivotal to any outcome. Beginning with meticulous research on the Hungarian case and then expanding to three other cases for a rigorous test of the author's argument, this book solves a key puzzle about who wins and who loses in the bargains that lie at the foundation of failed and successful regime change. This is an enlightening study that truly deserves a wide audience.' - Nancy Bermeo, Professor of Politics, Princeton University

The collapse of the Communist regimes after 1989, the closing of a long historical parenthesis, was a momentous event. In this study of the Hungarian transition John Schiemann offers the first analytical account of one of these processes, with wide implications for transitions more generally. In a compelling picture of bargaining under uncertainty, he shows how differing attitudes to risk rather than conflicting political demands generated the dynamics of the transition. It is a book that should be obligatory reading for students of regime change, who too easily come to see as inevitable what for the actors themselves was a highly contingent set of events. The Hungarian communists may have been moribund, but the world did not know it until they were dead. - Jon Elster, Robert K. Merton Professor of Social Science, Columbia University 'This highly original study adds greatly to our knowledge of pact-making and political bargaining by forcing us to think beyond the categoriess of 'regime' and 'opposition' and recognize that the role of risk-takers and risk-avoiders within each category is pivotal to any outcome. Beginning with meticulous research on the Hungarian case and then expanding to three other cases for a rigorous test of the author's argument, this book solves a key puzzle about who wins and who loses in the bargains that lie at the foundation of failed and successful regime change. This is an enlightening study that truly deserves a wide audience.' - Nancy Bermeo, Professor of Politics, Princeton University

"""The collapse of the Communist regimes after 1989, the closing of a long historical parenthesis, was a momentous event. In this study of the Hungarian transition John Schiemann offers the first analytical account of one of these processes, with wide implications for transitions more generally. In a compelling picture of bargaining under uncertainty, he shows how differing attitudes to risk rather than conflicting political demands generated the dynamics of the transition. It is a book that should be obligatory reading for students of regime change, who too easily come to see as inevitable what for the actors themselves was a highly contingent set of events. The Hungarian communists may have been moribund, but the world did not know it until they were dead."" - Jon Elster, Robert K. Merton Professor of Social Science, Columbia University 'This highly original study adds greatly to our knowledge of pact-making and political bargaining by forcing us to think beyond the categoriess of 'regime' and 'opposition' and recognize that the role of risk-takers and risk-avoiders within each category is pivotal to any outcome. Beginning with meticulous research on the Hungarian case and then expanding to three other cases for a rigorous test of the author's argument, this book solves a key puzzle about who wins and who loses in the bargains that lie at the foundation of failed and successful regime change. This is an enlightening study that truly deserves a wide audience.' - Nancy Bermeo, Professor of Politics, Princeton University"

Author Information

JOHN SCHIEMANN is an Assistant Professor of Administrative Science at Fairleigh Dickinson University, USA.

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