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OverviewAs national governments continue to disagree over how to respond to the aftermath of the global financial crisis, two of the few areas of consensus were the decisions to increase the IMF's capacity to respond and remove the policies designed to limit the use of its resources. Why was this massive increase in the size of the IMF, accompanied by the removal of policies designed to limit moral hazard, such an easy point of consensus? Michael Breen looks at the hidden politics behind IMF lending and proposes a new theory based on shareholder control. To test this theory, he combines statistical analysis with a sweeping account of IMF lending and conditionality during two global crises; the European sovereign debt crisis and the Asian financial crisis. Full Product DetailsAuthor: M. BreenPublisher: Palgrave Macmillan Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan Dimensions: Width: 14.00cm , Height: 1.20cm , Length: 21.60cm Weight: 3.943kg ISBN: 9781137263803ISBN 10: 1137263806 Pages: 219 Publication Date: 15 August 2013 Audience: College/higher education , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print  This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of ContentsReviewsTo come Author InformationMichael Breen is Lecturer at Dublin City University, Ireland, specializing in International Relations and International Political Economy. His recent work on the IMF has been published in the European Journal of International Relations and his work on the politics of sovereign debt is forthcoming in International Studies Quarterly. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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