Overview

This book proposes and explores the idea that the forced union of the aleatory and epistemic aspects of probability is a sterile hybrid, inspired and nourished for 300 years by a false hope of formalizing inductive reasoning, making uncertainty the object of precise calculation.  Because this is not really a possible goal, statistical inference is not, cannot be, doing for us today what we imagine it is doing for us.  It is for these reasons that statistical inference can be characterized as a myth. The book is aimed primarily at social scientists, for whom statistics and statistical inference are a common concern and frustration. Because the historical development given here is not merely anecdotal, but makes clear the guiding ideas and ambitions that motivated the formulation of particular methods, this book offers an understanding of statistical inference which has not hitherto been available. It will also serve as a supplement to the standard statistics texts. Finally, general readers will find here an interesting study with implications far beyond statistics.  The development of statistical inference, to its present position of prominence in the social sciences, epitomizes a number of trends in Western intellectual history of the last three centuries, and the 11th chapter, considering the function of statistical inference in light of our needs for structure, rules, authority, and consensus in general, develops some provocative parallels, especially between epistemology and politics.  

Full Product Details

Author:   Michael C. Acree
Publisher:   Springer Nature Switzerland AG
Imprint:   Springer Nature Switzerland AG
Edition:   1st ed. 2021
Weight:   0.857kg
ISBN:  

9783030732561

ISBN 10:   3030732568
Pages:   448
Publication Date:   06 July 2021
Audience:   Professional and scholarly ,  Professional & Vocational
Format:   Hardback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   Manufactured on demand  
We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier.

Table of Contents

1.       SYNOPSIS, BY WAY OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1     The problem as I originally confronted it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . 3                     The place of statistics in the social sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3                     Statistical inference and its misconceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5                     The root of the problem in the dualistic concept of probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7                 How this book came about . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9                 Some qualifications, objections, and implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12                     Intervening developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14                     Some qualifications regarding the historical argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   16                     An Ad hominem ipsum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   18                     References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    23   2.    THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT FOR THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY AND STATISTICAL INFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28            Brief excursus on historical cognitive change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29                Ancient Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29                Medieval Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31                General observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32            The concept of skeuomorphosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34                Early technologies of change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34                The emergence of the market economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35                Mathematical, mechanistic, and relativistic thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36                Scientific objectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37            Some consequences for epistemology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38                The concept of sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38                The combinatorics of language and thought . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40                Causality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42                Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44            Some psychological and cultural considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47                The emergence of self-consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47                Polarizations, alignments, and projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49                    Rejection of the feminine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51                    Mind and body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52                    Public and private . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54                    The rejection of roots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55            Summary and preview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58            References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 60    3.   ORIGIN OF THE MODERN CONCEPT OF PROBABILITY . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68            Why gambling per se didn’t lead to a mathematical theory of probability . . . . . . . . . 68            The concept of probability before the 17th century . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70            The calculus of expectation . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74            Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78            The Art of Conjecturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81                The law of large numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82                The metaphysical status of probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85                One word, two scales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86                    The scale of measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86                    The combination of evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .88            Implications for future developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  91            References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  97    4.   THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  102            Bayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  103            Laplace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108            Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110            References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 113    5.   NINETEENTH CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS IN STATISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115            Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  115                The normal curve in astronomy . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  115                Application of the normal curve to populations:  Quetelet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  117                Galton, Pearson, and the biometricians . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121            Precursors of significance testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  124                Arbuthnot’s and Gavarret’s use of the binomial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  124                Probabilistic criteria for the rejection of discordant observations in astronomy . . 127                The normal model and data in the social sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130                The pun on significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131                Small data sets in agricultural research . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  133            References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  136    6.   THE FREQUENCY THEORY OF PROBABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . 140            The principle of indifference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141            The frequency theorists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  144                Venn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144                Peirce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  146                Richard von Mises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148                Reichenbach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . .  151                Popper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  154            The concept of randomness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156            Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  160            References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  161    7.   THE FISHER AND NEYMAN-PEARSON THEORIES OF STATISTICAL     INFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  164            Fisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  164            The Fisherian theory of statistical inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . 167                Maximum likelihood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  168                Significance testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169                    Small-sample theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  170                    The hypothetical infinite population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  171                    Randomization tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173                    The success of significance testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  175                Fiducial probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  177            Neyman and Pearson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  182                Hypothesis testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  184                    The concept of probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187                    Implications for statistical inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  190                Confidence intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  193            Differences between the Fisher and Neyman-Pearson theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198            References . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203    8.   BAYESIAN THEORIES OF PROBABILITY AND STATISTICAL INFERENCE .  210            Logical theories of probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   210                Keynes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  210                Jeffreys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215                Jaynes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218            Personalist theories of probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220                Ramsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221                De Finetti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222                Savage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  225                Wald’s decision theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  227            General structure of Bayesian inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  228            Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  233                The logical allocation of prior probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  233                The subjective allocation of prior probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236                Subjectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .238            Putting theories to work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241            References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 243    9.   STATISTICAL INFERENCE IN PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247            Psychological measurement . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  247            From large-sample to small-sample theory in psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  257                The concept of probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  261                Significance versus confidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  262                Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   263                Random sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  263            To the present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  264            The context of use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267                Contexts of discovery versus verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267                Statistical significance as an indicator of research quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  268            Problems in application of statistical inference to psychological research . . . . . . . . 270                Epistemic versus behavioral orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  270                The literalness of acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271                The individual versus the aggregate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  272                The paradox of precision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   274                Identification with the null . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276                Random sampling from hypothetical infinite populations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  276                Assumption violation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   278                The impact of the preceding problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  279            Possible responses by frequentists and Bayesians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  280            Toward resolution:  The frequentists versus the Bayesians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  281            The recent integration of Bayesian concepts and methods in psychological and                medical research: The case of multiple imputation of missing data . . . . . . . . . . . 283            Postscript on statistics in medicine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  284            References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286   10.  RECENT WORK IN PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294            Statistical and nonstatistical inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294                The putative philosophical distinction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294                Psychological research on reasoning in statistical contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297                    Models of inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297                        Bayes’ Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298                        Clinical inference and multiple regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  302                        Causal inference and analysis of variance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303                    General issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .   304                        Atmosphere effects and the difficulty of abstract problems . . . . . . . . . . . . .  304                        Judgments of randomness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  306                    Randomness, representativeness, and replication in psychological research . .  307            The ontogenesis of probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309            The propensity theory of probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312            The likelihood theory of statistical inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316            Shafer’s theory of belief functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..318            Recent work on reasoning in philosophy and artificial intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . .  323                Some recent concepts from artificial intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  323                Bayesian versus Dempster-Shafer formalisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  326            On formalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  329                Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329                The relation between philosophy and psychology:  Bayesian theory . . . . . . . . . .  331                Purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332            Summary of challenges to Bayesian theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334            Postscript on Bayesian neuropsychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335            References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  336   11.  CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH . . . . .. 339            Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339                The concept of probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339                The concept of statistical inference . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341            The future of psychological research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344                     Surface obstacles to change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..344                     Possible paths for quantitative research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347                     The ambivalent promise of qualitative methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  350                     Toward deeper obstacles to change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352                 The philosophical, social, and psychological context for the emergence of                     a new epistemology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353                     Empty self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  355                     Empty world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  359                     Objectivity, skeuomorphosis, and the problem of scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  363                     The scarecrows of relativism and anarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366                 Biomedical research without a biomedical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367                 Postscript on Perceptual Control Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . .370                 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  374

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Michael C. Acree received his Ph.D. in psychology from Clark University in 1978, where he completed the clinical training program and also worked as Data Analysis Consultant for the Department of Psychology.  At the University of Nebraska—Lincoln he was the first member of the psychology faculty to be elected to all three programs—Experimental, Social, and Clinical.  During his 3 years there, he taught undergraduate courses in clinical and abnormal psychology and graduate statistics and supervised clinical practicum students.  After leaving Nebraska voluntarily in 1979, he was for 5 years Assistant Research Psychologist at the Center on Deafness at the University of California, San Francisco.  There he conducted long-term longitudinal research on prelingually deaf children, and was Principal Investigator on a $75,000 grant from the National Institute of Handicapped Research, entitled “Dialogue with Deaf Children: Its Relation to Intellectual and Personal Growth.”  From 1985 to 1990 he was Assistant Professor at the Pacific Graduate School of Psychology in Palo Alto, where he was awarded a $28,000 grant by the Chapman Research Fund on “Roots of Social Science Methodology: Ontogenesis and History.”  After 5 years as Associate Professor at the California Institute for Integral Studies in San Francisco, he joined the UCSF Center for AIDS Prevention Studies as Senior Statistician, and in 2001 he moved in the same capacity to the Osher Center for Integrative Medicine, until his retirement in 2017.

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