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OverviewCovering moral intuition, self-evidence, non-inferentiality, moral emotion and seeming states, Hossein Dabbagh defends the epistemology of moral intuitionism. His line of analysis resists the empirical challenges derived from empirical moral psychology and reveals the seeming-based account of moral intuitionism as the most tenable one. The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism combines epistemological intuitionism with work in neuroethics to develop an account of the role that moral intuition and emotion play in moral judgment. The book culminates in a convincing argument about the value of understanding moral intuitionism in terms of intellectual seeming and perceptual experience. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Hossein Dabbagh (New College of the Humanities, Northeastern University London, UK and the University of Oxford’s Department for Continuing Education, UK)Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing PLC Imprint: Bloomsbury Academic Dimensions: Width: 15.60cm , Height: 2.50cm , Length: 23.40cm Weight: 0.454kg ISBN: 9781350297579ISBN 10: 1350297577 Pages: 264 Publication Date: 29 December 2022 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: Manufactured on demand  We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier. Table of ContentsAcknowledgements Introduction Part I: Mind 1. Philosophical Intuition’s Mental Ontology 2. Moral Intuition’s Mental Ontology: Shifting from Philosophical to Moral Intuition 3. The Use of Intuition as Evidence Part II: Epistemology 4. Shaping Classic Moral Intuitionism: An Examination of H. A. Prichard’s and W. D. Ross’s Ideas 5. Towards the New Moderate Intuitionism: Recent Revivals of Contemporary Moral Intuitionism Part III: Neuroethics 6. Scepticism about Moral Intuition: How My Favoured Account of Intuition Rebuts the Neuroethicists’ Position 7. Scepticism about Moral Intuitionism: How My Favoured Account of Epistemological Intuitionism Rebuts Sinnott-Armstrong’s Position Afterword Notes Bibliography IndexReviewsHow does moral cognition work? And do our moral judgments ever amount to genuine knowledge? In this outstanding book, Hossein Dabbagh answers both questions: along the way, the intuitionist moral epistemology he develops shows how to resist empirically motivated moral skepticism and to vindicate intuitions as the foundation of moral knowledge. * Hanno Sauer, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Utrecht University, The Netherlands * Author InformationHossein Dabbagh is Assistant Professor in Applied Ethics at New College of the Humanities, Northeastern University London, UK, and Philosophy Tutor at the University of Oxford’s Department for Continuing Education, UK. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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