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OverviewOne of the most basic themes in the philosophy of language is referential uptake, viz., the question of what counts as properly 'understanding' a referring act in communication. In this inquiry, the particular line pursued goes back to Strawson's work on re-identification, but the immediate influence is that of Gareth Evans. It is argued that traditional and recent proposals fail to account for success in referential communication. A novel account is developed, resembling Evans' account in combining an external success condition with a Fregean one. But, in contrast to Evans, greater emphasis is placed on the action-enabling side of communication. Further topics discussed include the role of mental states in accounting for communication, the impact of re-identification on the understanding of referring acts, and Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction. Readership: Philosophers, cognitive scientists and semanticists. Full Product DetailsAuthor: M. PaulPublisher: Springer Imprint: Springer Edition: Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2000 Volume: 80 Dimensions: Width: 21.00cm , Height: 1.10cm , Length: 27.90cm Weight: 0.524kg ISBN: 9789048153220ISBN 10: 9048153220 Pages: 172 Publication Date: 28 October 2010 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: Out of stock The supplier is temporarily out of stock of this item. It will be ordered for you on backorder and shipped when it becomes available. Table of Contents1 Characterizing Referential Communicaton.- 2 Mental States in Referential Communication.- 3 RE-Identification in Referential Communication.- 4 Accounting for Mental Reference.- 5 Traditional Accounts of Success in Referential Communication.- 6 Evans’ Account of Success in Referential Communication.- 7 A New Account of Success in Referential Communication.- References.ReviewsAuthor InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |