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OverviewThis work examines the political economy of exchange-rate policies in the context of the eastward enlargement of the eurozone. The analysis shows that prospective members of the EMU are likely to pass on some of the incurred Maastricht costs of convergence to the current EMU-members. The transmission mechanism is an altered exchange-rate policy that is carried out utilizing a threaten-thy-neighbour -strategy. The nature of the arising conflict between current and prospective EMU-members originates from both parties' admitted inclination to complete the enlargement process, complicated by their disinclination to bear the costs. The ensuing moral-hazard behaviour of the CEECs proves to be one of brinkmanship. The subsequent bargaining game results in a robust outcome most likely in terms of providing extra European funding. This may then ensure a stabilization of the CEECs' convergence toward the EMU, and a successful completion of eastward enlargement of the eurozone. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Christian H FahrholzPublisher: Springer Imprint: Springer ISBN: 9786610701315ISBN 10: 6610701318 Pages: 157 Publication Date: 01 January 2007 Audience: General/trade , General Format: Electronic book text Publisher's Status: Active Availability: Out of stock The supplier is temporarily out of stock of this item. It will be ordered for you on backorder and shipped when it becomes available. Table of ContentsReviewsAuthor InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |