|
|
|||
|
||||
Overview"The law persists because people have reasons to comply with its rules. What characterizes those reasons is their interdependence: each of us only has a reason to comply because he or she expects the others to comply for the same reasons. The rules may help us to solve coordination problems, but the interaction patterns regulated by them also include Prisoner's Dilemma games, Division problems and Assurance problems. In these ""games"", the rules can only persist if people can be expected to be moved by considerations of fidelity and fairness, not only of prudence. This book takes a fresh look at the perennial problems of legal philosophy - the source of obligation to obey the law, the nature of authority, the relationship between law and morality, and the nature of legal argument - from the perspective of this conventionalist understanding of social rules. It argues that, since the resilience of such rules depends on cooperative dispositions, conventionalism, properly understood, does not imply positivism." Full Product DetailsAuthor: Govert HartoghPublisher: Kluwer Law International Imprint: Kluwer Law International Edition: 2002 ed. Volume: 56 Dimensions: Width: 15.50cm , Height: 2.20cm , Length: 23.50cm Weight: 1.340kg ISBN: 9789041117960ISBN 10: 9041117962 Pages: 291 Publication Date: 31 May 2002 Audience: College/higher education , Professional and scholarly , Undergraduate , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of ContentsReviewsAuthor InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |