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OverviewMoral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, so they are all false. This is the moral error theory, a deeply troubling yet plausible view that is now one of the canonical positions in moral philosophy. The most compelling argument against it is the argument from analogy. According to this, the moral error theory should be rejected because it would seriously compromise our practice of making epistemic judgments-judgments about how we ought to form and revise our beliefs in light of our evidence-and could undermine systematic thought and reason themselves. Christopher Cowie provides a novel assessment of the recent attention paid to this topic in moral philosophy and epistemology. He reasons that the argument from analogy fails because moral judgments are unlike judgments about how we ought to form and revise our beliefs in light of our evidence. On that basis, a moral error theory does not compromise the practice of making epistemic judgments. The moral error theory may be true after all, Cowie concludes, and if it is then we will simply have to live with its concerning consequences. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Christopher Cowie (Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Durham)Publisher: Oxford University Press Imprint: Oxford University Press Dimensions: Width: 14.30cm , Height: 1.90cm , Length: 21.90cm Weight: 0.432kg ISBN: 9780198842736ISBN 10: 0198842732 Pages: 246 Publication Date: 23 October 2019 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order  Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of ContentsIntroduction Part I. The Argument From Analogy 1: Moral Error Theory 2: The Analogy Part II. Against the Analogy 3: Against Internalism-Parity 4: Against Internalism-Parity: A Supplementary Argument 5: Against Irreducibility-Parity Part III. Elaboration 6: The Conventionalism Criticism 7: Simple Veritism 8: The Normativity of Evidence Part IV. Fall-Backs and Loose-Ends 9: Error Theory and Thought 10: A Puzzling Combination 11: ConclusionReviewsReaders interested in meta-normativity would do well to read it both to navigate the explosion of meta-normativity literature and as an example of numerous authorial virtues - clarity, precision, thoroughness and more. * Alex Murphy, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice * Readers interested in meta-normativity would do well to read it both to navigate the explosion of meta-normativity literature and as an example of numerous authorial virtues — clarity, precision, thoroughness and more. * Alex Murphy, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice * Readers interested in meta-normativity would do well to read it both to navigate the explosion of meta-normativity literature and as an example of numerous authorial virtues -- clarity, precision, thoroughness and more. * Alex Murphy, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice * Author InformationChristopher Cowie obtained his PhD from the University of Cambridge in 2014. He subsequently worked as a Research Fellow at Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge. Cowie is currently Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Durham. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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