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OverviewCompared to other kinds of knowledge, how fragile is our knowledge of morality? Does knowledge of the difference between right and wrong fundamentally differ from knowledge of other kinds, in that it cannot be forgotten? What makes reliable evidence in fundamental moral convictions? And what are the associated problems of using testimony as a source of moral knowledge? Sarah McGrath provides novel answers to these questions and many others, as she investigates the possibilities, sources, and characteristic vulnerabilities of moral knowledge. She also considers whether there is anything wrong with simply outsourcing moral questions to a moral expert and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the method of equilibrium as an account of how we make up our mind about moral questions. Ultimately, McGrath concludes that moral knowledge can be acquired in any of the ways in which we acquire ordinary empirical knowledge. Our efforts to acquire and preserve such knowledge, she argues, are subject to frustration in all of the same ways that our efforts to acquire and preserve ordinary empirical knowledge are. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Sarah McGrath (Associate Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University)Publisher: Oxford University Press Imprint: Oxford University Press Dimensions: Width: 15.90cm , Height: 1.80cm , Length: 24.00cm Weight: 0.492kg ISBN: 9780198805410ISBN 10: 0198805411 Pages: 240 Publication Date: 18 December 2019 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order  Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of Contents1: Introduction 2: Reflective Equilibrium, its virtues and its limits 3: Moral Knowledge from Others 4: Observation and Experience 5: Losing Moral Knowledge 6: ConclusionsReviewsAnyone interested in these matters will benefit from and enjoy reading and engaging with McGrath's book. * David Phillips, University of Houston, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (NDPR) * Author InformationSarah McGrath is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. She has written extensively on moral disagreement, moral testimony, moral expertise, and also about issues at the intersection of metaphysics and ethics. Her published work on these topics has appeared in leading philosophy publications, including The Journal of Philosophy, Ethics, and the Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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