Moral Hazard and Benefits Consumption Capital in Program Overlap: The Case of Workers’ Compensation

Author:   Richard J. Butler ,  Harold H. Gardner, MD
Publisher:   now publishers Inc
Volume:   27
ISBN:  

9781601984289


Pages:   66
Publication Date:   30 June 2011
Format:   Paperback
Availability:   Manufactured on demand   Availability explained
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Moral Hazard and Benefits Consumption Capital in Program Overlap: The Case of Workers’ Compensation


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Overview

This book reviews and extends the analysis of moral hazard response in two empirical directions: 1) how insurance changes in one program affects employee participation in other programs at a point in time (inter-program moral hazard), and 2) how the consumption of program benefits now tends to affect employees behavior over time (benefits consumption capital). The authors focus principally on workers compensation and programs that overlap with potential workers compensation coverage to keep institutional issues to a manageable level. This will not only include employer-provided health/health care insurance, short and long term disability insurance, and Federal benefits under the social security disability program, but also Federal benefits paid under unemployment insurance.

Full Product Details

Author:   Richard J. Butler ,  Harold H. Gardner, MD
Publisher:   now publishers Inc
Imprint:   now publishers Inc
Volume:   27
Dimensions:   Width: 15.60cm , Height: 0.30cm , Length: 23.40cm
Weight:   0.108kg
ISBN:  

9781601984289


ISBN 10:   1601984286
Pages:   66
Publication Date:   30 June 2011
Audience:   Professional and scholarly ,  Professional & Vocational
Format:   Paperback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   Manufactured on demand   Availability explained
We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier.

Table of Contents

"1. Introduction. 2. Worker' Compensation/Sick Leave as Prototypes for Program Overlap. 3. Evidence of Inter-program Moral Hazard. 4. Benefits Consumption Capital: ""Inter-temporal Moral Hazard"". 5. Moral hazard and the Concentration of Non-wage Benefits. 6. Some Concluding Observations. References."

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