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Author:   Sylvester Eijffinger ,  Donato Masciandaro
Publisher:   Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Imprint:   Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Volume:   291
Dimensions:   Width: 16.90cm , Height: 4.20cm , Length: 24.40cm
Weight:   1.306kg
ISBN:  

9781783472970

ISBN 10:   1783472979
Pages:   704
Publication Date:   25 April 2014
Audience:   College/higher education ,  Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly
Format:   Hardback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   In Print  
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Table of Contents

Contents Acknowledgements Introduction Sylvester Eijffinger and Donato Masciandaro PART I MONETARY POLICY: HOW TO GOVERN MONEY AND INTEREST RATES A New Classical View: Rational Expectations, Monetary Policy and Central Bankers 1. Thomas J. Sargent and Neil Wallace (1981), 'Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic' 2. Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon (1983), 'Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy' 3. Kenneth Rogoff (1985), 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target' 4. Susanne Lohmann (1992), 'Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility Versus Flexibility' 5. Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger and Marco Hoeberichts (1998), 'The Trade Off Between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness' B New Keynesian View: Market Imperfections, Monetary Policy and Real Effects 6. Ben S. Bernanke and Mark Gertler (1995), 'Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission' 7. Richard Clarida, Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler (1999), 'The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective' 8. Michael Woodford (2003), 'Optimal Interest-Rate Smoothing C Merging the Views: Monetary Policy and the Engineering of Rules and Institutions 9. John B. Taylor (1993), 'Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice' 10. Dale W. Henderson and Warwick J. McKibbin (1993), 'A Comparison of Some Basic Monetary Policy Regimes for Open Economies: Implications of Different Degrees of Instrument Adjustment and Wage Persistence' 11. Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini (1993), 'Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability' 12. Carl E. Walsh (1995), 'Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers' 13. Lars E.O. Svensson (1997), 'Optimal Inflation Targets, Conservative Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts' PART II CENTRAL BANKING: HOW TO DESIGN THE MONETARY ARCHITECTURES A Central Bank Independence 14. Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro and Guido Tabellini (1991), 'Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries' 15. Alex Cukierman, Steven B. Webb and Bilin Neyapti (1992), 'Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes' 16. Alberto Alesina and Lawrence H. Summers (1993), 'Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence' 17. Bennett T. McCallum (1995), 'Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence' 18. Adam S. Posen (1995), 'Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence' 19. Charles Goodhart and Dirk Schoenmaker (1995), 'Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision be Separated?' B Central Bank Accountability and Transparency 20. Clive Briault, Andrew Haldane and Mervyn King (1996), 'Central Bank Independence and Accountability: Theory and Evidence' 21. Otmar Issing (2005), 'Communication, Transparency, Accountability: Monetary Policy in the Twenty-First Century' 22. Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger and Petra M. Geraats (2006), 'How Transparent are Central Banks?' C Central Bank Communication 23. Alex Cukierman and Allan H. Meltzer (1986), 'A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information' 24. Marvin Goodfriend (1986), 'Monetary Mystique: Secrecy and Central Banking' 25. Alan S. Blinder, Michael Ehrmann, Marcel Fratzscher, Jakob de Haan and David-Jan Jansen (2008), 'Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence'

Reviews

'In the aftermath of the crisis, redesigning the institutional framework governing money and finance to foster financial stability has become a priority. This volume brings together key contributions that help elucidate the economic and political complexity that must be addressed to improve the governance of central banks and their contribution to economic and financial stability.' - Athanasios Orphanides, Professor of the Practice of Global Economics and Management, MIT Sloan School of Management

'In the aftermath of the crisis, redesigning the institutional framework governing money and finance to foster financial stability has become a priority. This volume brings together key contributions that help elucidate the economic and political complexity that must be addressed to improve the governance of central banks and their contribution to economic and financial stability.' -- Athanasios Orphanides, Professor of the Practice of Global Economics and Management, MIT Sloan School of Management

Author Information

Edited by Sylvester Eijffinger, Professor of Economics, Tilburg University, the Netherlands and CEPR and Donato Masciandaro, Professor of Economics, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy, and SUERF

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