Overview

"As Clausewitz observed, """"In war more than anywhere else, things do not turn out as we expect."""" The essence of war is a competitive reciprocal relationship with an adversary. Commanders and institutional leaders must recognize shortfalls and resolve gaps rapidly in the middle of the fog of war. The side that reacts best (and absorbs faster) increases its chances of winning. Mars Adapting examines what makes some military organizations better at this contest than others. It explores the institutional characteristics or attributes at play in learning quickly. Adaptation requires a dynamic process of acquiring knowledge, the utilization of that knowledge to alter a unit's skills, and the sharing of that learning to other units to integrate and institutionalize better operational practice. Mars Adapting explores the internal institutional factors that promote and enable military adaptation. It employs four cases, drawing upon one from each of the U.S. armed services. Each case was an extensive campaign, with several cycles of action/counteraction. In each case, the military institution entered the war with an existing mental model of the war they expected to fight. For example, the U.S. Navy prepared for decades to defeat the Japanese Imperial Navy and had developed carried-based aviation. Other capabilities, particularly the Fleet submarine, were applied as a major adaptation. The author establishes a theory called Organizational Learning Capacity that captures the transition of experience and knowledge from individuals into larger and higher levels of each military service through four major steps. The learning/change cycle is influenced, he argues, by four institutional attributes (leadership, organizational culture, learning mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms). The dynamic interplay of these institutional enablers shaped their ability to perceive and change appropriately."

Full Product Details

9781682475898

Table of Contents

Reviews

This work is going to become a classic of use to any of those who are interested in improving the performance of America's military institutions in war. Frank Hoffman has written an outstanding examination of the problems and issues involved in innovation and adaptation. His case studies come from all four of the U.S. services and provide wonderful insights into the actual difficulties that war presents to learning organizations. --Williamson Murray, professor emeritus at The Ohio State University In this original and important study, Frank Hoffman shows how a military's ability to adapt under fire is shaped by organisational capacities to learn lessons in war. With fascinating case studies of the U.S. armed services in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq, this is an essential read for students of military innovation. --Theo Farrell, professor and deputy vice-chancellor, University of Wollongong and former head of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

Author Information

Frank Hoffman holds an appointment as a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. He is a retired U.S. Marine infantry officer. His forty-two years in the U.S. defense establishment includes senior political appointments at the Pentagon, ten years at Headquarters Marine Corps, and a decade at NDU's Institute for National Strategic Studies. In addition to his research portfolio in strategy and military innovation, he has taught at the National War College. He earned his PhD in war studies from King's College, London.

Tab Content 6

Customer Reviews

Recent Reviews

Countries Available