Overview

An objective of this book is to discuss some of the contributions made by John Grote to philosophy. This work is an extension of a dissertation written for the doctorate at Boston University. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance in many places to Professor Peter A. Bertocci and the late Professor Edgar S. Brightman both of whom read the entire manuscript in its original form. Also, the author acknowledges the encouraging interest and support of his wife, Helen, whose many suggestions have improved the writing and without whose assistance this work would not have been accomplished. The author assumes complete responsibility for whatever errors or deficiencies appear in the book. All known writings of Grote are listed and the more important ones analyzed. LAUCHLIN D. MACDONALD CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1. JOHN GROTE'S LIFE i. Sketch of his life John Grote will remain best known by reason of the thought formu­ lated in the Exploratio Philosophica, or Rough Notes on Modern I ntellectu­ al Science. To the philosophical world of his own time he was well known as the teacher who ably held the chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge from r855 until the year of his death, r866, to the Knightbridge Professor, William Whewell whose in succession Philosophy of Science is the subject of at least one chapter of the Exploratio Philosophica. Grote's birthplace was Beckenham in Kent, and the date, May 5, r8r3.

Full Product Details

Author:   Lauchlin D. MacDonald
Publisher:   Springer
Imprint:   Springer
Dimensions:   Width: 15.50cm , Height: 1.70cm , Length: 23.50cm
Weight:   0.480kg
ISBN:  

9789401185042

ISBN 10:   9401185042
Pages:   284
Publication Date:   01 January 1966
Audience:   Professional and scholarly ,  Professional & Vocational
Format:   Paperback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   Manufactured on demand  
We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction.- 1. John Grote's Life.- i. Sketch of his lif.- ii. His brother.- iii. Relationship with Elli.- 2. Writings.- i. Writings enumerate.- ii. Remarks on writing.- iii. Additional information relating to circumstances under which writings were presente.- 3. Statement, and Division, of the Problem.- 4. Survey of Sources and of Previous Work on the Problem.- i. Source.- a. Plat.- b. Kant and other modern philosopher.- ii. Previous work on the proble.- 5. Transition to Next Chapter.- II. Grote's View of Phenomenalism.- I. Distinction of Terms: `Noumenon,' `Phenomenon,' and `Thing in Itself'.- i. Derivation and meaning of `noumenon,' and `phenomenon'.- a. `Noumenon'.- b. `Phenomenon'.- ii. `Noumenon,' `phenomenon,' and `thing in itself,' as used by Kant.- iii. Reinhold on `noumenon,' and `thing in itself'.- 2. What Phenomenalism Means.- i. Three ways in which phenomenalism has been regarded.- ii. Grote's meaning.- iii. Berkeley's meaning.- a. General.- b. Physiologist denies any distinction between `philosophy' and phenomena.- iv. Grote is specially concerned with `phenomenon' and `thing in itself`.- 3. Phenomenal Reality.- i. How it is' seen'.- ii. How it is related to life.- 4. Two Tests of Phenomenalism.- 5. The Phenomenalist Spirit or Mind.- 6. Summary and Foreword to Next Chapter.- III. Grote's Interpretation of the Relation of Phenomenalism to Philosophy.- 1. Each is Necessary to the Other.- 2. Consciousness as Active and Passive.- i. The phenomenalist view presupposes consciousness passive.- a. Consciousness of a process taking place between the matter of nature and the matter of our bodies.- b. Kant recognizes phenomenal reality as a necessary supplement to reason.- ii. Consciousness is also active.- a. Emphasis on `philosophy' may lead to epistemo-logical idealism.- b. Sensation, intelligence, and will.- (1) These three terms have a close relationship to each other.- (2) Sensation and experience.- (3) Contemplation is essentially non-phenomenal; communication is phenomenal.- (4) Contemplation is both active and passive.- (5) Commencement of willing requires particulars.- (6) Recapitulation on the knowing process.- 3. Analysis of Sensation.- i. Sensing in general.- a.' sensation proper' and `the sensation of our activity'.- b. Philosophy and logic.- ii. Two meanings of sensation.- 4. Time and Space.- i. Time, but not space, is necessary for acting and willing.- ii. Space adequately reveals to us our active nature.- iii. Sensation as a feeling, and sensation of our activity.- iv. Sensations of pleasure and of pain.- v. Time is common to both consciousness and phenomena.- vi. Space is only partially common to both consciousness and phenomena.- vii. Conception of space by analogy.- viii. Resume.- ix. Rationality ascribed to spatial objects.- 5. The Relationship of Phenomenalism to Philosophy Further Illustrated.- i. By taste.- ii. By sight.- a. The eye is virtually a machine.- b. Color is subjectively felt.- iii. Sensation of space is the same no matter what senses are used.- iv. Concerning the defining of `phenomenon'; Professor Brightman's definition and Grote's analysis.- v. Significance of sight among the senses.- vi. Mind' sees'.- vii. Quantity of phenomenal communication.- 6. Relationship Through Contrast.- i. Phenomenalist view reached through an unphenome-nal process.- ii. Phenomena as a deposit from our thinking.- iii. Extra-phenomenal elements in sensation make phenomena perceptual.- 7. Mind Provides Unity.- i. The extra-phenomenal gives unity.- ii. Phenomenal reality essentially obscured.- iii. Awareness is not the process of operation of phenomena.- 8. Grote Avoids A Basic Blunder in Behaviorism.- 9. Kant's Abstraction of Phenomenal Reality from Reason.- i. Kant stresses reason.- ii. Concerning the disengaging of the action of intelligence from all application and actual use of it .- iii. Basic agreement between Kant and Grote.- 10. Abstracting of Consciousness from Phenomena is Unwarranted.- i. Descartes.- ii. Spinoza.- 11. Historical Recapitulation.- 12. Main Contribution of the Chapter, with Comment.- 13. Transition to Next Chapter.- IV. Philosophy As Consciousness and the Ego.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Ferrier's Treatment of Philosophy and Phenomenalism.- i. The philosophical and the phenomenalist views clearly-distinguished by Ferrier.- ii. Subject-object relation.- iii. The ego and the non-ego.- 3. Criticism of Grote and Ferrier on the Basis of Lotze's Position.- i. The Non-Ego is not essential to the Ego.- ii. Three interpretations of the objection, to the personality of God, considered.- iii. Human mind projected into nature.- a. Not necessary for mind to project itself into nature.- b. No projection of mind in the complete view.- 4. Meaning of `Know,' and `Know About,' in Reference to Phenomenal Reality.- i. The knowing of phenomenal reality viewed in two ways.- ii. `Know' and `know about' in relation to phenomena and things in themselves.- 5. Relativity of Knowledge.- i. Knowledge is essentially relative.- ii. Misleading to speak of `modes of existence'.- iii. Misleading view presented by Ferrier in writing about the `Primary Law of Condition of all Knowledge'.- iv. `Ordinary' and `natural' thinking.- 6. Summary of Main Issues.- V. `Philosophy' and the Scale of Sensation.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Importance of the Scale of Sensation.- i. Meaning of sensation very significant.- ii. `The scale of sensation'.- iii. The center of the scale.- iv. Importance of the scale of sensation for Hamilton's position.- v. Locke's error resembles Hamilton's.- 3. Two Kinds of Knowledge - `Higher' and `Lower'.- i. Meaning of the terms.- a. `Higher philosophy'.- b. `Lower philosophy'.- ii. Reid's answer to skeptics is impotent.- iii. Hamilton regards the `philosophy' of knowledge as the analysis of consciousness.- a. Grote points out the defect in Hamilton's use of the term `consciousness'.- b. Grote states a reason for Hamilton's `consciousness' of the external world.- c. Hamilton's writing on consciousness vitiated.- d. `Natural Dualism' and `Hypothetical Dualists'.- e. Matter is only one entity of which we are conscious.- f. Hamilton states that he knows matter, even before he examines consciousness of it.- g. We are immediately cognizant of the non-ego.- 4. Hamilton, Mill and Reid Compared.- i. Hamilton and Mill - starting-point of each in regard to philosophy and phenomena.- ii. Hamilton and Reid.- iii. Source of Hamilton's error.- iv. Source of Mill's error.- 5. Descartes and Hamilton.- i. Descartes's epistemological approach, and Hamilton's.- ii. Hamilton's imperfect application of consciousness.- 6. Proper Use of Certain Terms in Relation to the Scale of Sensation.- i. `Presence' and `presentation'.- ii. `Presentation' and `representation'.- iii. `Mediate' and `immediate'.- 7. Critical Reflection on the Foregoing Chapter.- VI. Phenomenalist Logic and Knowledge.- 1. Introductory.- i. Brief resume.- ii. Relation of the' scale of sensation' to phenomenalist logic.- 2. Grote's Own Position Revealed Through Criticism of Hamilton and Mill.- i. Mill and Hamilton - their consistency compared.- ii. Basis of Hamilton's error.- iii. Mill is justified in writing on phenomenalist logic.- iv. Formal and Real Logic contrasted.- v. Mill's phenomenalism and Hamilton's `philosophy'.- vi. Spencer's reflections support Grote.- vii. Mill is faithful to phenomenalist logic.- a. General comment.- b. `Names' and `notions'.- c. Syllogistic logic.- 3. Phenomenalism Inadequate For A Perfect Scheme of Knowledge.- i. Reasoning not an element in phenomenal reality.- ii. Time and space, and phenomenal reality.- iii. Belief and phenomena.- iv. Mis-psychology.- 4. Critical Observations and Analyses.- i. Why Grote deals with Hamilton and Mill at all.- ii. Things in themselves and phenomena.- iii. Further reflections on `phenomenon'.- iv. Personalism.- v. Transition.- VII. The Introspective Method in Knowledge.- 1. Introduction.- i. Introspection concerned both with `knowing' and the `known'.- ii. Ideas not innate but of empirical origin.- iii. Reflection has both active and passive elements.- iv. Two questions faced in this chapter.- 2. Locke's Psychology.- i. Error in the introspective method.- ii. Mis-psychology.- iii. The mind as a tabula rasa.- iv. All experience requires ideas.- v. Ideas give the `external world' meaning.- vi. Phenomenal reality cannot produce thought.- vii. Primary and secondary qualities.- viii. Interrelations among ideas.- ix. Locke emphasizes the `philosophical' and the phenomenal approaches to epistemology, interchangeably.- x. Grote's suggested improvement for Locke's introspective method.- a. Locke should have recognized the `purely mental experience' in our mental history.- b. Appraisal of Grote's suggestion.- 3. Hume's Rationalism.- i. `Mis-psychology'.- ii. Strong tendency toward rationalism.- iii. `The creative power of the mind'.- iv. Place of mind in `impression'.- v. Relations.- vi. Are cause and effect relations concerned with ideas or with matters of fact?.- vii. Idea, impression, and `impressioning'.- 4. Berkeley's Subjectivism.- i. Berkeley's approach wholly `philosophical'.- ii. Importance of judgment.- iii. Vision at the eye.- iv. Phenomenalism evident in Berkeley.- v. Fundamental agreement between Grote and Berkeley.- vi. Berkeley's illustration valuable to Grote's interpretation.- 5. Spencer's and Morell's Evolutionism.- i. Spencer repeats the error of the Lockian psychology.- ii. Identity of consciousness of facts with the facts themselves.- iii. Perfect success of the attempt to harmonize thought with things reveals truth.- iv. Spencer compared with Spinoza.- v. Not necessary to trace the growth of knowledge to reveal truth.- vi. Spencer compared with Locke.- vii. Explanation by considering the genesis of thought is inadequate.- viii. `The experience-hypothesis'.- ix. Criticism of the use of the term `experience'.- x. Much evidence of `bad psychology' in Spencer.- xi. Explanation of the origin of `consciousness' is unsatisfactory.- xii. Morell's `bad psychology'.- a. Morell resembles Spencer in repeating the error of the Lockian psychology.- b. Concerning the origin of consciousness.- c. Morell compared with Spencer.- 6. Retrospect and Prospect.- i. Retrospect.- a. Purpose.- b. Locke.- c. Hume.- d. Berkeley.- e. Spencer (and Morell).- ii. Prospect.- VIII. Immediateness and Reflection.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Purpose of the Chapter in Introducing These Terms.- 3. Meaning of Immediateness and Reflection.- i. No reality without mind.- ii. `Immediate' and `mediate' thought.- iii. The' self-self and the `thought-self.- iv. Where reflective thought departs from immediate-ness.- v. Reflectional intelligence.- vi. Immediate knowledge possesses a minimum of reflection.- vii. Immediate thought develops into knowledge.- viii. `Pre-distinctional' immediateness.- ix. Intuition.- a. Meaning of `intuition'.- b. Trueness of `intuition'.- x. Antithesis between immediateness and reflection.- xi. Criticism of Kant's `experience'.- xii. English philosophy unjustified in making antithesis between `ideas' and `experience'.- xiii. Immediateness, and' subject' and `object'.- xiv. Self-consciousness not dependent upon the `objective'.- xv. Sensibility and activity.- a. Want.- b. `Reflectiveness'.- c. Reflection as action.- d. Semi-consciousness.- xvi. Immediateness and reflection illustrated by carpet.- xvii. A paradox.- xviii. `Knowledge of acquaintance' and `knowledge of judgment'.- a. Intuition as `looking on'.- b. Basis for distinction arises in immediateness and reflection.- c. Analogy in Ferrier.- 4. Significance of Immediateness and Reflection in Grote's Philosophy.- 5. Critical Comment.- 6. Relation to the Following Chapter.- IX. Personalism in Grote's Writings.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Epistemological Monism.- 3. Monistic, Pluralistic, and Theistic Personalism.- i. Grote's unique personalism.- ii. Monism and pluralism.- a. Introductory.- b. Monism.- c. Pluralism.- iii. Theism.- a. Grote, a Berkeleian ?.- b. Resemblances to Berkeley.- c. Grote is essentially theistic.- 4. Critique of Materialism.- i. The natural sciences.- a. Psychical anatomists.- b. Professed materialists.- c. New Realists.- c. Imagination and memory.- ii. `Proverse' and `retroverse'.- a. Significance of these terms.- b. Bain's psychology.- 5. Critical Comment.- i. Intuition.- ii. The' self-self'.- iii. Attitude toward materialism.- iv. Analysis of sensation into two elements.- 6. Summary and Transition to Next Chapter.- X. Grote's Idealism.- 1. Introduction.- i. Ideal-ism.- ii. Personal idealism evident in ethics and epistemology.- iii. Distinctions in idealisms.- 2. Grote's Platonism.- i. Ideals.- ii. Examination of a dialogue.- iii. Grote's idealism evident.- iv. Anti-relativjstic, generally.- v. Of utmost importance to teach ideals.- vi. Ideal and approbative ethics.- 3. Critique of Utilitarianism.- i. Relation of this critique to views on Plato.- ii. Problems not settled in utilitarianism.- iii. Descriptive and normative ethics.- iv. Why adopt `the greatest happiness' standard.- v. Activity and virtue.- vi. Eudaemonia.- a. Relation to `aretaics'.- b. Reason for including `aretaics'.- vii. Bentham's influence in popularizing hedonism.- viii. Difficulties which Mill's utilitarianism does not avoid.- a. Whose happiness not answered.- b. Mill's utilitarianism uses extraneous elements.- c. Mill's positivism helpless by itself.- ix. Non-idealist origin of Bentham's utilitarianism.- x. Grote's idealism akin to idealism in Christianity.- xi. Idealism haunts Mill's utilitarianism.- xii. Quantity and quality amongst pleasures.- xiii. Utilitarianism suffers from lack of sufficient and consistent idealism.- 4. A Critique of Moral Ideals.- i. Idealism basic in Grote's two works in the field of ethics.- ii. `Aretaics' and `eudaemonics' kept separate.- iii. Criticism of Grote's sharp distinction between `aretaics' and `eudaemonics'.- iv. Want or `egence'.- 5. Critical Remarks.- i. Bases of Grote's idealism enumerated.- ii. General criticism covering the foregoing bases.- 6. Concluding Note to this Chapter.- Conclusion.- 1. Grote's Position in the History of Philosophy.- i. Scanty position given to Grote in modern philosophy.- ii. John Grote overshadowed by his brother, George.- iii. Bain's slight reference to Grote.- iv. Stephen's reference to Grote.- v. Remarks in an obituary notice.- vi. `Knowledge of acquaintance' and `knowledge about'.- a. James's debt to Grote.- b. Eaton's debt to Grote.- c. Boswell's Life of Samuel Johnson.- d. Robinson refers to `William James's famous distinction'.- e. Joseph acknowledges Grote's distinction.- f. Whitehead's relation to Grote.- g. Ward's adequate reference to Grote.- h. Sellars' reference to Grote.- i. Mackenzie gives proper credit to Grote.- j. Brightman's informative reference to and acknowledgment of Grote.- vii. Two recent and peculiarly significant references to Grote's philosophy.- 2. Further Critical Comment.- Appendix: An Exposition of the Miscellaneous Writings of John Grote.- I. On A Furture State .- 1. Glorification of body and mind.- 2. Simplicity of style and thought in this article.- 3. Effect of present life on the future.- 4. Manner of individual appearance in a future life is unimportant.- 5. Stress on the importance of both present and future life.- 6. Comment.- II. On Glossology .- 1. Concerning terminology.- i. Break in Grote's projected work on glossology.- ii.' Phone' and `noem'.- iii.' Phonism' and `noematism'.- iv. Ideas of physical `things'.- v. Stomatism.- vi. `Hypophonism'.- 2. The philosophy of language.- i. Four divisions.- ii. `Noematism'.- iii. `Noematoschematism'.- iv.' Phonarium'.- v. `Dianoematism'.- vi. In extreme cases the modification in noematism is very great.- 3. Criticism of Tooke.- 4. Criticism of Trench.- 5. Comment.- III. Thought vs. Learning .- 1. A contrast.- 2. Use of one's own mind is of chief importance.- 3. Thought and learning stagnation.- 4. Comment.- IV. Pascal and Montaigne .- 1. A brief comparison.- 2. Pascal's devotion to religion.- 3. Montaigne's neopaganism.- 4. Pascal on happiness.- 5. Comment.- V. On the Dating of Ancient History .- 1. Dating of events by two methods - epochal and eponymous.- 2. Dynastical reckoning.- 3. Olympiadic dating.- 4. Dating by lunar months.- 5. Dating originating in Christendom.- 6. Other methods of dating.- 7. Present and future methods of dating.- VI. Origin and Meaning of Roman Names .- 1. Significance of `nomen,' `praenomen,' and `cognomen'.- 2. Criticism of Plutarch.- 3. Change in a Roman name.- 4. Criticism of Varro's view.- 5. Present-day names based on Roman rather than on Greek.- VII. Conclusion to Miscellaneous Writings.- Chronological Bibliography of the Writings of John Grote.- General Bibliography.

Reviews

Author Information

Tab Content 6

Author Website:  

Customer Reviews

Recent Reviews

No review item found!

Add your own review!

Countries Available

All regions