Getting Things Right: Fittingness, Reasons, and Value

Author:   Conor McHugh (Associate Professor in Philosophy, University of Southampton) ,  Jonathan Way (Professor of Philosophy, University of Southampton)
Publisher:   Oxford University Press
ISBN:  

9780198810322


Pages:   224
Publication Date:   28 October 2022
Format:   Hardback
Availability:   In Print   Availability explained
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Getting Things Right: Fittingness, Reasons, and Value


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Author:   Conor McHugh (Associate Professor in Philosophy, University of Southampton) ,  Jonathan Way (Professor of Philosophy, University of Southampton)
Publisher:   Oxford University Press
Imprint:   Oxford University Press
Dimensions:   Width: 16.00cm , Height: 1.60cm , Length: 24.00cm
Weight:   0.478kg
ISBN:  

9780198810322


ISBN 10:   0198810326
Pages:   224
Publication Date:   28 October 2022
Audience:   College/higher education ,  Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly
Format:   Hardback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   In Print   Availability explained
This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us.

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Reviews

A model of clarity, packed with arguments. A must-read for anyone working on normativity. * Hille Paakkunainen, Syracuse University * This excellent book offers the most comprehensive and compelling development to date of the important fittingness-first approach to normative theorizing. It is essential reading for philosophers interested in the nature of normative reasons and normativity more broadly. * Justin Snedegar, University of St. Andrews *


Author Information

Conor McHugh is Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He has worked on a range of topics in epistemology, value theory, and philosophy of mind. These include the nature of belief and of attitudes more generally, normativity, reasons and reasoning, mental agency, doxastic non-voluntarism, and self-knowledge. He has published on these topics in leading journals such as Ethics, Mind, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. He is the co-editor, with Jonathan Way and Daniel Whiting, of Normativity: Epistemic and Practical (OUP, 2018) and Metaepistemology (OUP, 2018). Jonathan Way is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He works on a range of topics in ethics and epistemology. He is especially interested in questions about reasons, rationality, value, and normativity, across the epistemic, practical, and affective domains. He has published on these issues in leading journals such as Ethics, Mind, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. He is the co-editor, with Conor McHugh and Daniel Whiting, of Normativity: Epistemic and Practical (OUP, 2018) and Metaepistemology (OUP, 2018).

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