Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis

Author:   J.F. Mertens ,  S. Sorin
Publisher:   Springer
Edition:   Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1994
Volume:   77
ISBN:  

9789048144426


Pages:   268
Publication Date:   05 December 2010
Format:   Paperback
Availability:   Manufactured on demand   Availability explained
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Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis


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Overview

This book presents the first systematic exposition of the use of game-theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Rather than focusing on single concepts it covers all basic equivalence theorems -- core, bargaining set, Shapley and Harsanyi value, Nash equilibria -- including an axiomatic approach to them. It treats thoroughly the value of large games, and the new tools used in the strategic approach to general equilibrium. The different chapters are written by leaders of their respective fields. The book is primarily addressed to researchers and advanced graduate students, but being largely self-contained, it can also be used as a text for a course.

Full Product Details

Author:   J.F. Mertens ,  S. Sorin
Publisher:   Springer
Imprint:   Springer
Edition:   Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1994
Volume:   77
Dimensions:   Width: 15.20cm , Height: 1.40cm , Length: 22.90cm
Weight:   0.454kg
ISBN:  

9789048144426


ISBN 10:   9048144426
Pages:   268
Publication Date:   05 December 2010
Audience:   Professional and scholarly ,  Professional & Vocational
Format:   Paperback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   Manufactured on demand   Availability explained
We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier.

Table of Contents

A The Core and the Bargaining Set.- I General Equilibrium and Cooperative Games: Basic Results.- II Core Convergence in Perfectly Competitive Economies.- III Economies with Atoms.- IV Bargaining Sets.- B The Value.- V The Shapley Value.- VI Value of Games with a Continuum of Players.- VII The TU Value: The Non-differentiable Case.- Addendum: The Shapley value of a perfectly competitive market may not exist.- VIII The Harsanyi Value.- IX Value Equivalence Theorems: The TU and NTU Cases.- X Economic Applications of the Shapley Value.- C The Cooperative Approach to Large Markets and Games.- XI An Axiomatic Approach to the Equivalence Phenomenon.- XII Large Games and Economies with Effective Small Groups.- D The Non-Cooperative Approach.- XIII Strategic Market Games: a Survey of Some Results.- XIV From Nash to Walras Equilibrium.- XV Correlated- and Communication Equilibria.- XVI Notes on Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium.- XVII Implementation with Plain Conversation.

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