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OverviewThis book presents the first systematic exposition of the use of game-theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Rather than focusing on single concepts it covers all basic equivalence theorems -- core, bargaining set, Shapley and Harsanyi value, Nash equilibria -- including an axiomatic approach to them. It treats thoroughly the value of large games, and the new tools used in the strategic approach to general equilibrium. The different chapters are written by leaders of their respective fields. The book is primarily addressed to researchers and advanced graduate students, but being largely self-contained, it can also be used as a text for a course. Full Product DetailsAuthor: J.F. Mertens , S. SorinPublisher: Springer Imprint: Springer Edition: Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1994 Volume: 77 Dimensions: Width: 15.20cm , Height: 1.40cm , Length: 22.90cm Weight: 0.454kg ISBN: 9789048144426ISBN 10: 9048144426 Pages: 268 Publication Date: 05 December 2010 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: Manufactured on demand We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier. Table of ContentsA The Core and the Bargaining Set.- I General Equilibrium and Cooperative Games: Basic Results.- II Core Convergence in Perfectly Competitive Economies.- III Economies with Atoms.- IV Bargaining Sets.- B The Value.- V The Shapley Value.- VI Value of Games with a Continuum of Players.- VII The TU Value: The Non-differentiable Case.- Addendum: The Shapley value of a perfectly competitive market may not exist.- VIII The Harsanyi Value.- IX Value Equivalence Theorems: The TU and NTU Cases.- X Economic Applications of the Shapley Value.- C The Cooperative Approach to Large Markets and Games.- XI An Axiomatic Approach to the Equivalence Phenomenon.- XII Large Games and Economies with Effective Small Groups.- D The Non-Cooperative Approach.- XIII Strategic Market Games: a Survey of Some Results.- XIV From Nash to Walras Equilibrium.- XV Correlated- and Communication Equilibria.- XVI Notes on Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium.- XVII Implementation with Plain Conversation.ReviewsAuthor InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |