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OverviewPhilosophers have long debated whether morality is objective. But how do lay people think about this matter? A Philosophical Perspective on Folk Moral Objectivism discusses the philosophical aspects of this question in an accessible, integrated and coherent way. The first part argues that many empirical studies have been unsuccessful in fully or exclusively measuring beliefs about moral objectivity. Still, there are a few lessons that can be drawn from them. Most importantly, lay people are not objectivists. They believe that moral statements only express desires or that their truth is relative to individuals or cultures. The book’s second part considers ways in which these empirical findings may help assess philosophical theories about moral objectivity. Overall, findings about people’s moral objectivity beliefs suggest that morality is not objective. The truth of the matter may even lie beyond the traditional objectivism/non-objectivism dichotomy. This book develops a unique perspective on a thriving new area of research. It is a valuable resource for upper level undergraduates, postgraduates and researchers in moral psychology, theoretical psychology, experimental philosophy, metaethics and philosophy of the mind. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Thomas PölzlerPublisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd Imprint: Routledge Weight: 0.335kg ISBN: 9780367539740ISBN 10: 0367539748 Pages: 228 Publication Date: 16 December 2022 Audience: College/higher education , Tertiary & Higher Education Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print  This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of Contents1. Introduction Part I: Empirical Research 2. The Methodology of Research on Moral Objectivity Beliefs 3. The Content of Moral Objectivity Beliefs 4. The Correlates of Moral Objectivity Beliefs 5. The Causes and Consequences of Moral Objectivity Beliefs Part II: Philosophical Implications 6. The Presumptive Argument for Objectivism 7. The Debunking Argument for Non-Objectivism/Skepticism 8. The Conceptual Argument for Objectivism/Error Theory 9. Some Further Arguments 10. ConclusionReviewsAuthor InformationThomas Pölzler is a researcher and lecturer at the Philosophy Department of the University of Graz, Austria. He mainly works on moral psychology and metaethics. Among his many publications are Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences (Routledge, 2018) as well as articles in journals such as Synthese, Inquiry and Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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