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OverviewFull Product DetailsAuthor: Javier Corrales (Professor of Political Science, Professor of Political Science, Amherst College)Publisher: Oxford University Press Inc Imprint: Oxford University Press Inc Dimensions: Width: 23.60cm , Height: 2.00cm , Length: 16.00cm Weight: 0.544kg ISBN: 9780190868895ISBN 10: 0190868899 Pages: 286 Publication Date: 12 July 2018 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: Manufactured on demand  We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier. Table of ContentsPart I: The Argument 1. Introduction: Fixing Democracy 2. The Argument: Power Asymmetries, Constitutions, and Presidential Powers Part II: Explaining Constituent Assemblies and Presidential Powers 3. Origins: Rise and Death of Constituent Assemblies in Latin America 4. Content: Constitutional Rewrites and Changes in Presidential Powers Part III: Case Studies 5. Venezuela: Extreme Variations in Power Asymmetries 6. Bolivia: Natural Resources, Demographics, and Reduced Asymmetry 7. Ecuador: When the Opposition Splits Part III: Power Asymmetry and Self-Dealing 8. Term Limits: Self-Dealing, Power Asymmetries, and Changes to Time in Office Part IV: Conclusion 9. ConclusionReviewsCorrales's theory of power asymmetry resonates with the Latin American experience: constitutions are pacts, and their viability and content depend on the initial balance of forces between the president and the opposition. This book is central to emerging debates about the endogenous nature of institutional design. -An bal P rez-Li n, University of Notre Dame Javier Corrales's Fixing Democracy is an important theoretical and empirical contribution to the study of constitutionalism, presidentialism, democratization and Latin American politics. Corrales argues that power-diffusing constitutions are an asset for democracies and that they are most likely to emerge when there is a relative symmetry of power between incumbents and the opposition. Constitutions that give presidents great powers can pave the way to democratic erosions; they are most likely when presidents have much more power than oppositions. -Scott Mainwaring, Harvard University Fixing Democracy is an outstanding book on how the constitutional authority of Latin American presidents expands or is constrained, with major implications for the stability of democratic regimes and the troubling tendency for illiberal backsliding. The book speaks to a large literature on the effects of presidential constitutions in Latin America, but goes well beyond it by showing how constitutions themselves are shaped. Corrales's book is a model of theoretical sophistication and mixed-method empirical research. It will have an important impact on how we think about the challenges facing democracy in Latin America and, potentially, other regions as well. - Robert Kaufman, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University Author InformationJavier Corrales is Dwight W. Morrow 1895 Professor of Political Science at Amherst College and obtained his PhD in Government from Harvard University in 1996. He specializes in comparative politics and international relations of Latin America. He has written extensively on economic reforms, democratization, presidential powers, term limits, education policy and international relations. He has been a Fulbright scholar in Bogotá, Colombia, and Caracas, Venezuela. He is on the editorial board of Latin American Politics and Society and Americas Quarterly, and the European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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