Overview

A unique first-hand account of the planning and execution of the opening campaign in the invasion of Iraq. Given the length of time the United States spent in Iraq, there is a perception that there was no consideration before the war of what should be done after coalition forces arrived in Baghdad and removed Saddam Hussein. However as this unofficial history reveals, there was a great deal of planning to address how to achieve the policy objectives for Iraq set by the Bush administration. Kevin Benson-director of plans for the United States Third Army, the ground forces command headquarters for GEN Franks' Central Command, at the start of the war-details the development of the invasion plan and its subsequent execution from D-Day in March 2003 until the change of command of operations in Iraq and the departure of Third Army in June 2003. He addresses the persistent trope that “the Army did no planning” for “Phase IV,” revealing that extensive plans were proposed, and were met with very little interest in Washington. The book covers the difficulties encountered in dealing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, from getting his approval on the number of forces requested to conducting the campaign to find the “smoking gun” of WMD; the instructions given to Army, Marine and coalition forces; and the daily secure video teleconferences with Central Command and the Pentagon, and the rather remarkable conversations and guidance that came from these meetings. AUTHOR: Kevin Benson served in the US Army as a commander and general staff officer for 30 years. He was the Director of Plans for Third U.S. Army and the Combined Forces Land Component Command at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, from July 2002 to July 2003. His final assignment in the US Army was Director, School of Advanced Military Studies, at Fort Leavenworth, KS. He writes for professional journals and web sites ranging from Parameters, Military Review, and ARMY magazine to Strategy Bridge and the Modern War Institute. He reviews books for ARMY magazine.

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9781636244266

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"""Of all the many mistakes the United States made in invading Iraq, none was as damning as the mishandling of postwar security and reconstruction. The place to start to understand that fiasco is with Kevin Benson's Expectation of Valor. No one is better placed to do so as Benson led the U.S. Army's planning team for the invasion and its aftermath. It was their plan that was disregarded and that could have led to a far better outcome had it been followed. In these pages, Benson explains how that plan was crafted, the obstacles it faced, and how it was ultimately ignored. It is a story both fascinating and tragic, and all too important.""--Kenneth M. Pollack, former CIA Persian Gulf military analyst and author of ""Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness"""

"""Kevin Benson has recounted all the planning dynamics that led up to and occurred during OIF I and the ground invasion into Iraq. With a unique planner's detail and perspective, he has provided a masterful accounting that any future planners and commanders should pay close attention to. Written with a 'as it happened' perspective, Kevin's journal is a must read for military leaders!""--GEN David McKiernan, former commanding general of Third Army/CFLCC during Operation Iraqi Freedom/COBRA II ""Dive into the mind of a master strategist! Benson leads you through the complex situations, strategic maneuvers, and courageous choices that influenced a conflict with far-reaching impacts on our world. This book is a must-read for any leader and planner.""--John Antal, best-selling author, military analyst and Soldier ""This is a remarkable book by a most able and professional officer.... What Colonel Benson has written is far more than just a war diary that illustrates the complexity, tensions, pressure, workload and necessary detail of planning within what was in 'old speak' an army group at war. What clearly emerges as the story unfolds is the complete disconnect between policy (strategy, if any) and the decisions made at a much higher level that, in the event, directly contributed to not achieving the policy objectives... I highly commend this seminal work by Colonel Benson but not just for SAMS or Higher Command and Staff students, but one that potential statesmen and senior administrators would be well advised to study.""--Major General A. E. Whitley (ret.) CMG CBE WO ""The consummate planner, Kevin Benson chronicles a detailed and thoroughly accurate saga of the intense and complex planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom I. Expectation of Valor pulls back the curtain on the extraordinary efforts put forth to plan and execute a large-scale operation. The good, bad, and ugly aspects should make it required reading for military professionals and government officials.""--Lt Gen Robert R. Blackman, Jr. USMC (ret) Chief of Staff, Combined Forces Land Component Command during Operation Iraqi Freedom/COBRA II ""Of all the many mistakes the United States made in invading Iraq, none was as damning as the mishandling of postwar security and reconstruction. The place to start to understand that fiasco is with Kevin Benson's Expectation of Valor. No one is better placed to do so as Benson led the U.S. Army's planning team for the invasion and its aftermath. It was their plan that was disregarded and that could have led to a far better outcome had it been followed. In these pages, Benson explains how that plan was crafted, the obstacles it faced, and how it was ultimately ignored. It is a story both fascinating and tragic, and all too important.""--Kenneth M. Pollack, former CIA Persian Gulf military analyst and author of ""Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness"""

Author Information

Kevin Benson served in the US Army as a commander and general staff officer for 30 years. He was the Director of Plans for Third U.S. Army and the Combined Forces Land Component Command at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, from July 2002 to July 2003. His final assignment in the US Army was Director, School of Advanced Military Studies, at Fort Leavenworth, KS. He writes for professional journals and web sites ranging from Parameters, Military Review, and ARMY magazine to Strategy Bridge and the Modern War Institute. He reviews books for ARMY magazine.

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