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OverviewThis book offers the first systematic discussion of a new and promising field: the economics of independence, accountability and governance of financial supervision institutions. For a long time the design of supervision had been an irrelevant issue, both in theory and practice. This perception changed dramatically in the mid-1990s, and over the past decade many countries have witnessed changes in the architecture of financial supervision. This book presents frameworks for analyzing the emerging supervisory architectures and sheds light on the different supervisory regimes, with a particular focus on the role of central banks. It takes a country-specific, comparative and empirical approach. Designing Financial Supervision Institutions will be an accessible reference tool for multidisciplinary scholars and academics (principally economics, but also politics and law), policymakers, regulators and supervisory institutions. All royalties from this book to go to the UK charity, NSPCC. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Donato Masciandaro , Marc QuintynPublisher: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Imprint: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Edition: illustrated edition Dimensions: Width: 13.80cm , Height: 3.40cm , Length: 21.60cm Weight: 0.744kg ISBN: 9781847202161ISBN 10: 1847202160 Pages: 528 Publication Date: 28 August 2007 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of ContentsContents: Foreword Donato Masciandaro and Marc Quintyn Introduction Charles Goodhart PART I: INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE 1. Robust Regulators and their Political Masters: Independence and Accountability in Theory Marc Quintyn and Michael W. Taylor 2. Independence and Accountability in Supervision: General Principles and European Setting Lorenzo Bini Smaghi 3. The Fear of Freedom: Politicians and the Independence and Accountability of Financial Supervisors in Practice Marc Quintyn, Silvia Ramirez and Michael W. Taylor 4. Independence and Accountability: Why Politics Matters Jonathan Westrup 5. Governance in Banking Supervision: Theory and Practices Marco Arnone, Salim M. Darbar and Alessandro Gambini PART II: THE DESIGN OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS 6. Financial Supervision Architecture and Central Bank Independence Andreas Freytag and Donato Masciandaro 7. Architectures of Supervisory Authorities and Banking Supervision Marco Arnone and Alessandro Gambini 8. Experience with Integrated Supervisors: Governance and Quality of Supervision Martin Čihák and Richard Podpiera 9. Financial Supervisors: Alternative Models Giorgio Di Giorgio and Carmine Di Noia 10. Budgetary Governance of Banking Supervision: A Primer Donato Masciandaro, Maria Nieto and Henriëtte Prast PART III: IN SEARCH OF THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 11. Bureaucrats or Politicians? Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini 12. Agency Problems in Banking Supervision Robert A. Eisenbeis IndexReviews'This is a collection of essays written by eminent economists and policy studies scholars... this is a useful book in its presentation of empirical research to policymakers, lawyers and economists on a subject of immense interest and currency.' -- Jason Chuah, Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 'The volume is rich in information on the design of financial supervisory institutions around the globe, includes interesting analytical work and provides a structured discussion of the relevant policy issues. Researchers and policymakers in the field of financial regulation and supervision will find it useful.' -- SUERF Author InformationEdited by Donato Masciandaro, Full Professor of Economics and Chair in Economics of Financial Regulation, Bocconi University, Italy and Marc Quintyn, Division Chief, International Monetary Fund’s Institute, US Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |