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OverviewMany constitutions include provisions intended to limit the discretion of governments in economic policy. In times of financial crises, such provisions often come under pressure as a result of calls for exceptional responses to crisis situations. This volume assesses the ability of constitutional orders all over the world to cope with financial crises, and the demands for emergency powers that typically accompany them. Bringing together a variety of perspectives from legal scholars, economists, and political scientists, this volume traces the long-run implications of financial crises for constitutional order. In exploring the theoretical and practical problems raised by the constitutionalization of economic policy during times of severe crisis, this volume showcases an array of constitutional design options and the ways they channel governmental responses to emergency. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Tom Ginsburg (University of Chicago) , Mark D. Rosen (Illinois Institute of Technology) , Georg Vanberg (Duke University, North Carolina)Publisher: Cambridge University Press Imprint: Cambridge University Press Dimensions: Width: 15.20cm , Height: 1.80cm , Length: 22.90cm Weight: 0.462kg ISBN: 9781108729208ISBN 10: 1108729207 Pages: 342 Publication Date: 30 June 2022 Audience: Professional and scholarly , College/higher education , Professional & Vocational , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: Manufactured on demand  We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier. Table of Contents1. Introduction Tom Ginsburg, Mark Rosen and Georg Vanberg; Part I. The Role of Constitutions in Dealing with Crises: 2. Financial emergencies John Ferejohn; 3. Rule-of-law objections to the lender of last resort Eric A. Posner; 4. Balanced budget provisions in constitutions Tom Ginsburg; 5. Legislatures and constitutions in times of severe financial crisis Mark D. Rosen; Part II. Courts and Crises: 6. The place of economic crisis in American constitutional law: the Great Depression as a case study Barry Cushman; 7. Financial crises and constitutional compromise Georg Vanberg and Mitu Gulati; 8. Commitment for cowards: why the judicialization of austerity is bad policy and even worse politics Daniel Kelemen; 9. Protecting fundamental rights during financial crisis: supranational adjudication in the Council of Europe Eva Brems; Part III. Supranational Governance and Crisis: 10. Constitutionalism as limitation and license: crisis governance in the European Union Turkuler Isiksel; 11. The institutional origin of Europe's constitutional crises: Grexit, Brexit and the EU form of government Federico Fabbrini; Part IV. Implementing Austerity: 12. The constitutional performance of austerity in Portugal Teresa Violante and Patrícia André; 13. Constitutional resilience and constitutional failure in the face of crisis: the Greek case Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou; Part V. The Effect of Crises on Constitutions: 14. Economic crises, political fragmentation, and constitutional choice: the agenda-setting power of presidents in Latin America Gabriel L. Negretto; 15. Constitutions, crisis, and regime change: perspectives on East and Southeast Asia Björn Dressel.Reviews'... this work is an excellent academic account for researchers ... this volume is well described as a showcase for an array of constitutional design options and the ways they channel governmental responses to emergency.' Elizabeth Robson Taylor, Phillip Taylor, The Barrister Author InformationTom Ginsburg is Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago Law School. Mark D. Rosen is University Distinguished Professor at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. Georg Vanberg is Professor of Political Science and Law, and current Chair of the Department of Political Science at Duke University, North Carolina. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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