Overview

Epistemology is not just about the nature of knowledge or the analysis of concepts such as 'knows' and 'justified'. It is also about what we ought to believe and how we ought to investigate and reason about what is true. This book is a study of these normative aspects of epistemology. More specifically, it is concerned with the nature of epistemic norms and their relation both to the value of knowledge and to the structure of cognitive agency. The first part develops a theory of doxastic agency according to which believers exercise agency centrally in the ongoing activity of maintaining systems of belief. The second part defends an account of the grip epistemic norms have on us and the nature of our epistemic values. These are explained in terms of the way that a person's belief, can be subject to robust social norms and be valued for its stability not only individually, but, crucially, within epistemic communities. The third part proposes inferentialist foundations for a meta-epistemological theory of epistemic discourse that takes seriously the idea that knowledge attributions are partly normative, and hence should be partly classified on the 'ought' side of the division between claims about what reality is like, and claims about what people ought to do, think, and feel.

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9780198993421

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Reviews

Belief, Agency and Knowledge is a triumph. It provides a sustained defense of a truly social approach to human knowledge, one which rejects the longstanding philosophical assumption that knowing is something we do in isolation, and instead embraces the community as the starting point of any epistemological investigation. In so doing, it provides a strikingly original account of the norms of inquiry and sheds light on free belief, the pursuit of truth and the role of responsible belief in democracy. * Michael Patrick Lynch, Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at University of Connecticut * Wilfrid Sellars once said, ""in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing... we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says."" Matthew Chrisman has done more than anybody else to make Sellar's idea about knowledge, and about epistemic evaluation more generally, both precise and plausible. His book is a pleasure to read. * Ram Neta, Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill * In Belief, Agency, and Knowledge, Matthew Chrisman aims to illuminate the nature of epistemic normativity. His main innovation lies in how he traces the source and authority of epistemic norms to our social relationship with one other in our joint effort to determine how the world is. This is a bold vision, one informed not only by recent debates in the theory of knowledge but also by themes from philosophy of mind, action theory, and political philosophy. * Sandford Goldberg, Chester D. Tripp Professor in the Humanities, Northwestern University *

Author Information

Matthew Chrisman is Professor of Ethics and Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh. His research is focused on epistemology, metaethics, philosophy of language, and political philosophy. He has published widely in these areas, including articles in Noûs, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy & Public Affairs, and The Journal of Philosophy. Chrisman is the author of The Meaning of 'Ought' and What Is This Thing Called Metaethics? He was elected a member of the Young Academy of Scotland in 2016, where he led in creation of the Young Academy of Scotland's Charter for Responsible Debate. He completed his PhD and MA at the University of North Carolina, and his BA at Rice University.

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