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OverviewThe way in which society views addiction underlies how it treats, understands, blames, or even punishes those with addictive behaviours. This thought-provoking new book presents an original philosophical analysis bringing together addiction and weakness of will. Within the book, the author develops an integrated account of these two phenomena, rooted in a classical conception of akrasia as valuing without intending and at the same time intending without valuing. This fascinating and suggestive account addresses a number of paradoxes faced by current thinking about addiction and weakness of will, in particular the significance of control and intention for responsible action.Addiction and Weakness of Will makes an original contribution to central issues in moral psychology and philosophy of action, including the relationship between responsibility and intentional agency, and the nature and scope of moral appraisal. The book is valuable for philosophers, ethicists and psychiatrists with an interest in philosophy. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Lubomira Radoilska (Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Kent, Canterbury, and Affiliated Lecturer, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge)Publisher: Oxford University Press Imprint: Oxford University Press Dimensions: Width: 15.70cm , Height: 0.90cm , Length: 23.40cm Weight: 0.250kg ISBN: 9780199641963ISBN 10: 019964196 Pages: 160 Publication Date: 28 November 2013 Audience: College/higher education , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order  Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of ContentsIntroduction: The Moral Philosophy of Addiction and Weakness of Will 1: Addiction and Voluntary Control 1.1: Wallace on Responsibility and Control 1.2: The Disparity of Actions and Attitudes 1.3: Responsibility for Addiction: Excuses and Exemptions 1.4: Actions and Omissions Revisited 1.5: Positive Moral Appraisal 2: Addiction and Rational Judgement 2.1: Smith on Responsibility for Attitudes 2.2: Responsible Irrationality 2.2.1: Conflicting Attitudes 2.2.2: Implications for Paradigm Cases: Patterns of Awareness and Wholehearted Attitudes 2.3: Is Responsibility Best Understood as a Cluster Concept? 2.4: Addiction and Agential Evaluative Stance 2.4.1: De Quincey: Confessions of an English Opium Eater 2.4.2: Dostoevsky: The Gambler 3: Weakness of Will and Moral Appraisal 3.1: Arplay on Responsibility in the Absence of Control 3.2: Standard Akrasia 3.3: Inverse Akrasia 3.3.1: Inept Burglar 3.3.2: Neoptolemus 3.3.3: Huckleberry Finn 3.4: Strength Versus Goodness of Will 3.4.1: Mizogushi 4: Before Weakness of Will 4.1: Holton on Weakness of Will 4.2: Aristotle on Akrasia 4.2.1: The Logical Form of Akrasia 4.2.2: The Blameworthiness of Akrasia 4.2.3: The Pre-Intentionality of Akrasia 4.3: Revisting Weakness of Will 4.4: Weakness of Will as a Failure to Resist Akrasia 5: Addiction and Weakness of Will: An Integrated Account 5.1: Actions as Actualization 5.2: Success in Action and the Guise of the Good 5.3: Less than Successful Actions 5.4: Concluding Remarks:The Offspring of AkrasiaReviewsA dense and serious exploration of foundational issues in moral psychology, with an eye most especially on the conditions under which agents are morally responsible for akratic behaviour... Specialists in moral responsibility and moral psychology will benefit considerably from reading Radoilska's view, especially her sustained criticisms of accounts that currently dominate the landscape Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Author InformationLubomira Radoilska's research has focused on developing a new theory of autonomous agency and exploring its implications in core areas of philosophy. She holds a doctorate in philosophy from Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris. Since 2003, she has held the following positions at the University of Cambridge: Research Fellow at Clare Hall, Director of Studies at New Hall and Downing College, and Wellcome Trust Fellow at the Faculty of Philosophy, where she is currently an Affiliated Lecturer. Since September 2003, she also holds a Lectureship in Philosophy at the University of Kent, Canterbury. Lubomira Radoilska is the author of 'Aristotle and the Moral Philosophy of Today' (PUF, 2007) and editor of 'Autonomy and Mental Disorder' (OUP, 2012). Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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