Free Delivery Over $100
|
|
|||
|
||||
OverviewThis is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures at the University of Essex, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. This book concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Debraj Ray (Julius Silver Professor of Economics, New York University)Publisher: Oxford University Press Imprint: Oxford University Press Dimensions: Width: 16.30cm , Height: 2.50cm , Length: 24.20cm Weight: 0.655kg ISBN: 9780199207954ISBN 10: 019920795 Pages: 336 Publication Date: 01 November 2007 Audience: College/higher education , Undergraduate , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order  Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of ContentsPreface 1: Introduction Part 1 The Setting 2: Ingredients for a Theory of Agreements 3: Coalitions, Cooperation, and Non-Cooperation Part 2 The Bargaining Approach to Coalitions Formation 4: Irreversible Agreements 5: Irreversible Agreements: Symmetric Games 6: Applications 7: Irreversible Agreements: The General Case 8: A Framework for Reversible Commitments 9: Reversible Agreements Without Externalities 10: Reversible Agreements With Externalities Part 3 A Blocking Approach to Coalition Formation 11: Blocking 12: Irreversible Commitments 13: The Blocking Approach in Real Time 14: DirectionsReviews`Debraj Ray has systematically re-examined the theory of coalition formation. In this book, he develops a broad and fundamental theory to help us better understand the problems of forming efficient social structures.' Roger Myerson, the Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of Economics, University of Chicago `The issues addressed lie at the heart of game theory, yet have received too little attention. One hopes that young scholars will use this superb monograph as a launching pad to explore the many important, fascinating and unresolved questions to which Ray directs our attention.' Dilip Abreu, Edward E. Matthews, Class of 1953, Professor of Finance and Professor of Economics beautifully written should be required reading for any young economic theorist B. Douglas Bernheim, Edward Ames Edmonds Professor of Economics, Stanford University A must for anyone who wishes to discover the treasures hidden within the cooperative approach. Ariel Rubinstein, Professor of Economics, Tel Aviv University and New York University Ray's substantial accomplishments in this area will inspire researchers and students alike. Robert Wilson, Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Emeritus, Stanford Graduate School of Business a masterful account Dilip Abreu, Edward E. Matthews, Class of 1953, Professor of Finance and Professor of Economics Author InformationDebraj Ray is Julius Silver Professor of Economics and Director of Graduate Studies in Economics at New York University. He has held long-term appointments at Stanford University, the Indian Statistical Institute, and Boston University. He has held numerous visiting appointments at Harvard University, MIT, the Instituto de Matemática Pura e Aplicada (Rio De Janeiro), the People's University of China (Beijing), and the London School of Economics. He is a Permanent Research Affiliate of the Instituto de Análisis Económico (Barcelona). Professor Ray is a Fellow of the Econometric Society, a recipient of the Mahalanobis Memorial Medal, and a recipient of the Outstanding Young Scientists Award (in the area of mathematics) from the Indian National Science Academy. He received the Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching at Stanford and the Gittner Award for Teaching Excellence in Economics at Boston University. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
||||
