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OverviewMicroeconomic Theory is based on lecture notes for a graduate course in microeconomic theory. It covers a broad range of topics, and to some extent the lecture structure is retained in the style of the book. The author provides a clear account of the main ideas in each area concisely, and in some depth of detail. The presentation is at an advanced level and provides succinct coverage of the material in a self contained discussion. Chapters are organized and written independently making it possible to read any chapter without having read earlier material. Each chaper is written on the presumption that the reader has some familiarity with the topics or issues under discussion but would value further discussion, or a second point of view . While much of the material is mainstream, a substantial portion is not available in existing textbooks. The book covers a range of topics appearing in advanced courses in microeconomic theory. Coverage includes such topics as decision theory, strategic and extensive form games, auctions, bargaining, information models, principal- agent problems, signalling and screening games, cooperative games and models of learning. Full Product DetailsAuthor: James Bergin (, Professor of Economics, Queen's University, Ontario)Publisher: Oxford University Press Imprint: Oxford University Press Dimensions: Width: 17.70cm , Height: 2.60cm , Length: 25.40cm Weight: 0.808kg ISBN: 9780199280292ISBN 10: 0199280290 Pages: 384 Publication Date: 19 May 2005 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of Contents1: Decision Theory 2: Preferences, Risk, and Stochastic Dominance 3: Strategic Form Games 4: Nash Equilibrium- Existence and Refinements 5: Mechanism Design 6: Auctions I: Independent Values 7: Auctions II: Dependent Values 8: Extensive Form Games 9: Equilibrium in Extensive Game Forms 10: Repeated Games 11: Bargaining 12: Information 13: The Principal-Agent Problem 14: Signaling 15: Screening 16: Common Knowledge 17: Mechanism Design: Complete and Incomplete Information 18: Cooperative Outcomes 19: Large Games 20: Evolution and LearningReviewsAuthor InformationJames Bergin is Professor of Economics at Queen's University and Canada Research Chair Holder. James holds degrees from Princeton, London School of Economics and the National University of Ireland. His research interests include mechanism design, learning and evolutionary game theory, and anonymous games. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |