Overview

'These things happened. They were glorious and they changed the world,' said Charlie Wilson of America's role in supporting the mujahideen against the Soviet Union. 'And then we fucked up the endgame.' The scandal-prone US Congressman lamented the absence of support for Afghanistan after that war, a vacuum which the Taliban and Osama bin Laden would fill. The Ledger identifies and assesses the failures of the West's approach to Afghanistan after 9/11 - military, diplomatic, political and developmental. For Afghans, the war is not over because the West has declared it so, and neither will its geo-political effects simply disappear along with the last of NATO forces. Afghanistan remains connected to the world through communications and the networks of the last twenty years. The Ledger also considers these lessons for the benefit of future, similar peacebuilding missions in Africa and elsewhere. Dr David Kilcullen and Dr Greg Mills are uniquely placed to reflect backwards and forwards on the Afghan conflict, having worked with the international mission as advisers and within the Arg. Both have considerable experience of counter-insurgency and stability operations elsewhere, in Latin America, Asia and across Africa. There is plenty of blame to go around, as this book shows, in the attempts to bring peace to Afghanistan after 9/11. The signs of the collapse had been there for a long-time, mostly conveniently ignored as they were ill-suited to the political narrative of 'we're making progress' and then, as the deadline drew closer, 'mission accomplished'. In understanding why and where the failure took place, The Ledger warns against the eternal human curse in believing that we can be an exception to all that precedes us. Whatever the desire to avoid future military and diplomatic 'quagmires', the reality is that politicians will not always follow that advice, nor can these crises always be avoided.

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9781787386952

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'This explanation of the failure of the international mission and fall of Kabul contains salient lessons for us all, now and in the future.' -- General Mohammad Yasin Zia, former Chief of General Staff, Afghanistan 'Clear-minded, and closely involved for many years in the West's Afghan project, the authors of this passionate and important book are determined that we do not repeat elsewhere the shameful way it ended.' -- Sir Rodric Braithwaite, author of Afgantsy

'This explanation of the failure of the international mission and fall of Kabul contains salient lessons for us all, now and in the future.' -- General Mohammad Yasin Zia, former Chief of General Staff, Afghanistan 'The Ledger explains the reasons for yesterday's failure in Afghanistan. It also clarifies the imperative for tomorrow's international engagement.' -- Commander Ahmad Massoud 'What went wrong and what went right in Afghanistan? This brilliant analysis by two people who were there has many of the answers.' -- General Sir Nick Carter, Chief of the Defence Staff, United Kingdom 'Based on years of courageous fieldwork, The Ledger's careful analysis is a timely reminder of what happens when internal and external state-building efforts are misaligned.' -- Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Nobel Peace Laureate, former President of Liberia 'Clear-minded, and closely involved for many years in the West's Afghan project, the authors of this passionate and important book are determined that we do not repeat elsewhere the shameful way it ended.' -- Sir Rodric Braithwaite, author of Afgantsy 'The Ledger makes vividly clear the do's and don't's of foreign intervention - key lessons applicable beyond Afghanistan.' -- General Sergio Mantilla, former Chief of the Colombian Army 'Based on the authors' extensive first-hand experience in Afghanistan and peace missions elsewhere, The Ledger goes to the heart of why the Afghan mission failed and what we must do to avoid future, similar disasters. Read it, and learn.' -- Karin von Hippel, Director-General, Royal United Services Institute 'The authors had their boots on the ground and it shows in this searing account of what went wrong in Afghanistan.' -- Ambassador Juan-Carlos Pinzon, former Minister of Defence, Colombia 'An analytical tour de force.' -- Ambassador Barry Desker, Distinguished Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University 'With immense elegance, empathy, respect for Afghans, and deep understanding of the local terrain and context, Kilcullen and Mills explain something otherwise very difficult to understand: how a comparatively small Taliban force was able to achieve such a stunning and rapid victory over a large, conventional army.' -- Rory Stewart, former UK Secretary of State for International Development 'Few have enjoyed the access and experience of Kilcullen and Mills in Afghanistan this century, evident in the richness of their critique of Western attempts to, first, stabilise the country and, later, rebuild it. The Ledger brings to life the dilemmas and bitter lessons of the policy-maker, diplomat and military professional alike, and lays out a workable strategy for building peace.' -- Swaran Singh, Professor for Diplomacy and Disarmament, Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University 'In accounting for success and failure in Afghanistan, The Ledger provides crystal-clear do's and don't's for future, similar missions.' -- General Richard B. Myers, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; President, Kansas State University '[The Ledger] is a clear-eyed analysis made with the surgical precision of two insiders who saw, firsthand, the legion of small ways that the war was lost when it could have been won.' -- The Sunday Times 'A failure to understand the ties that bind Afghanistan and its people underpins the west's 20-year struggle there, a history whose first draft is masterfully captured in The Ledger.' -- Financial Times

Author Information

David Kilcullen is an author, unconventional warfare expert, and former soldier and diplomat. He was a senior counterinsurgency adviser during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Greg Mills, Director of the Brenthurst Foundation, has advised African governments, and served in Afghanistan with COMISAF. His books with Hurst include 'Why States Recover'.

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