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OverviewThe United States and the Soviet Union could drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals below the levels prescribed by the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The end of the Cold War and the transformation of international security now under way present the United States with opportunities to develop new policies based on greater international cooperation with the Soviet Union and other major powers. This new book describes two lower levels of nuclear forces that could be achieved, as well as other related measures to improve international security. Table of Contents Front Matter Executive Summary I. Introduction: The Changing Political/Military Environment for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy II. New Objectives for Nuclear Weapons Policy III. Prospects for Cooperative Security Arrangements and Nuclear Nonproliferation IV. Nuclear Forces V. Controlling Strategic Force Operations VI. Summary of Conclusions Appendix A: Current U.S. and Soviet Strategic Froces and the Start Limits Appendix B: Target Allocation Issues Appendix C: The Sensitivity of Strike Results to Preattack Planning Factors Glossary Full Product DetailsAuthor: National Academy of Sciences , Committee on International Security and Arms ControlPublisher: National Academies Press Imprint: National Academies Press ISBN: 9780309045827ISBN 10: 0309045827 Pages: 76 Publication Date: 01 February 1991 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of Contents1 Front Matter; 2 Executive Summary; 3 I. Introduction: The Changing Political/Military Environment for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy; 4 II. New Objectives for Nuclear Weapons Policy; 5 III. Prospects for Cooperative Security Arrangements and Nuclear Nonproliferation; 6 IV. Nuclear Forces; 7 V. Controlling Strategic Force Operations; 8 VI. Summary of Conclusions; 9 Appendix A: Current U.S. and Soviet Strategic Froces and the Start Limits; 10 Appendix B: Target Allocation Issues; 11 Appendix C: The Sensitivity of Strike Results to Preattack Planning Factors; 12 GlossaryReviewsAuthor InformationCommittee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |