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Overview"During the height of the Cold War, between 1965 and 1968, Robert Aumann, Michael Maschler and Richard Stearns collaborated on research on the dynamics of arms control negotiations that has since become foundational to work on repeated games. These five seminal papers are collected in this text, with the addition of ""postscripts"" describing many of the developments since the papers were written. The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others. The original work, done under contract to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was intended to tackle the gradual disarmament problem, in which neither player knew what his own payoff would be for any given agreement, because of uncertainty about the other side's arsenal and weapons production technology. But the research soon became much more generalized, covering information concealment and revelation, signalling and learning and related ideas in any repeated competitive situation. The first four chapters of the book treat the competitive zero-sum side of the theory of repeated games. Chapter five takes up co-operative phenomena where one player may want to signal information to another." Full Product DetailsAuthor: Robert J. Aumann , Micheal B. Maschler , Richard E. StearnsPublisher: MIT Press Ltd Imprint: MIT Press Edition: New ed. Dimensions: Width: 16.00cm , Height: 2.80cm , Length: 23.10cm Weight: 0.726kg ISBN: 9780262011471ISBN 10: 0262011476 Pages: 360 Publication Date: 16 May 1995 Audience: College/higher education , Professional and scholarly , Undergraduate , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print  This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of ContentsGame theoretic aspects of gradual disarmament, postscripts; repeated games with incomplete information - a survey of recent results, postscripts; a formal information concept for games with incomplete information; repeated games of incomplete information - the zero-sum extensive case, postscripts; repeated games of incomplete information - an approach to the non-zero-sum case, postscripts.ReviewsAuthor InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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