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OverviewThis comprehensive textbook applies economic analysis to public law. The economic analysis of law has revolutionized legal scholarship and teaching in the last half-century, but it has focused mostly on private law, business law, and criminal law. This book extends the analysis to fundamental topics in public law, such as the separation of government powers, regulation by agencies, constitutional rights, and elections. Every public law involves six fundamental processes of government: bargaining, voting, entrenching, delegating, adjudicating, and enforcing. The book devotes two chapters to each process, beginning with the economic theory and then applying the theory to a wide range of puzzles and problems in law. Each chapter concentrates on cases and legal doctrine, showing the relevance of economics to the work of lawyers and judges. Featuring lucid, accessible writing and engaging examples, the book addresses enduring topics in public law as well as modern controversies, including gerrymandering, voter identification laws, and qualified immunity for police. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Robert Cooter (Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law, Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law) , Michael Gilbert (Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Vice Dean and Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law)Publisher: Oxford University Press Inc Imprint: Oxford University Press Inc Dimensions: Width: 25.10cm , Height: 4.10cm , Length: 17.70cm Weight: 1.107kg ISBN: 9780197655887ISBN 10: 0197655882 Pages: 624 Publication Date: 13 December 2022 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of ContentsAcknowledgments Dedidcation List of Boxes List of Figures List of Tables Chapter 1. Introduction to Public Law and Economics Chapter 2. Theory of Bargaining Chapter 3. Bargaining Applications Chapter 4. Theory of Voting Chapter 5. Voting Applications Chapter 6. Theory of Entrenchment Chapter 7. Entrenchment Applications Chapter 8. Theory of Delegation Chapter 9. Delegation Applications Chapter 10. Theory of Adjudication Chapter 11. Adjudication Applications Chapter 12. Theory of Enforcement Chapter 13. Enforcement ApplicationsReviewsAuthor InformationRobert Cooter is the Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley. He is a pioneer in the field of law and economics and has received various awards and fellowships, including the Ronald H. Coase Medal and the Humboldt Research Prize. He was a founding director of the American Law and Economics Association and is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Michael Gilbert is the Vice Dean and Martha Lubin Karsh and Bruce A. Karsh Bicentennial Professor of Law at the University of Virginia, where he teaches classes on election law, legislation, and law and economics. His research applies economic theory to topics in public law, including elections, entrenchment, corruption, and constitutional rights. He is the inaugural director of UVA's Center for Public Law and Political Economy. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |