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OverviewThis timely book, published in advance of 2010’s inter-governmental Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, makes available for the first time newly declassified government correspondence from David Owen’s tenure as Foreign Secretary. Nuclear Papers gives new insight into the work of, and response to, the last major strategic nuclear study of the UK’s nuclear needs, which was undertaken in 1978. The book demonstrates sustained dialogue between the Callaghan and Carter administrations on the one hand but also the internal disputes and concerns of the UK government as the Cold War and a bleak economic outlook exerted equal pressures, in much the same way as recent foreign policy and the economic downturn have challenged the current government. Owen skilfully ties the events of 30 years ago to the present, highlighting Barack Obama’s determination to “show the world that America believes in its existing commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to work ultimately to eliminate all nuclear arms”. As ever, David Owen is at the forefront of debate, arguing convincingly that momentum should be established towards the elimination of nuclear weapons by all five of the existing declared nuclear weapon states before the 2010 NPT Review Conference gets underway. This book, then, is an attempt to rejuvenate and expand discussions of the future of the world’s nuclear weapons by exploring the classified and highly sensitive debates of the past. It will be required reading for anyone interested in UK and US nuclear policy. Full Product DetailsAuthor: David Anthony Llewellyn OwenPublisher: Liverpool University Press Imprint: Liverpool University Press Dimensions: Width: 16.30cm , Height: 2.00cm , Length: 23.90cm Weight: 0.622kg ISBN: 9781846312274ISBN 10: 1846312272 Pages: 256 Publication Date: 29 October 2009 Audience: General/trade , General Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Out of Print Availability: Awaiting stock Table of ContentsReviewsAs UK foreign secretary from 1977 to 1979, Owen was deeply involved in the last major strategic study of the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent in 1978. In this volume he presents newly declassified government papers from that period and calls for nuclear abolition before the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Survival 201009 As UK foreign secretary from 1977 to 1979, Owen was deeply involved in the last major strategic study of the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent in 1978. In this volume he presents newly declassified government papers from that period and calls for nuclear abolition before the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Survival 201009 In this book David Owen, formerly British Foreign Secretary and one time Minister for the Navy, has put together a collection of official government papers with his own correspondence etc, concerning British nuclear weapons policy. Most of this is pretty esoteric, and will only interest those studying the minutiae of government thinking on the subject. For the general reader the most interesting material is to be found in the author's more recent reflections, which are to be found in the introduction, in Chapter 1 (on the nuclear deterrent) and in Appendix E, on 'the future'. Lord Owen was one of the four British political 'heavyweights' (along with Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind and George Robertson) who published an article in The Times on 30 June 2008 advocating the 'ditching' of the British bomb in order to promote eventual global nuclear disarmament. In this they were following a similar move by Henry Kissinger and others in the United States. So it is clear that Lord Owen is in favour of getting rid of nuclear deterrence altogether. Furthermore, he argues (pp. 17-19) that it is extremely important to make some unambiguous moves in this direction before the beginning of the forthcoming review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty early in 2010, otherwise there is a danger that the Treaty will crumble and consequently some states will decide to develop their own nuclear weapons capability. This would be a disaster. But Lord Owen has no objections to the strategy of nuclear deterrence as such. His concern is largely with practicalities, including costs. His preference, which shows through in a number of places in the book, is for Britain to rely for its deterrent on nuclear-armed cruise missiles. These are nowadays extremely accurate, and can pretty well be guaranteed to hit individual buildings, not to mention other very small targets. Furthermore, they can be mounted on the submarines which the navy already has, or will soon acquire. They do not need the huge, specially dedicated, submarines which any replacement for Trident will require (and which will form the biggest part of the cost). He is confident that the issue of cancelling the proposed Trident replacement will have to be addressed in any case, whichever government is elected in 2010. But he also thinks that for the next 10 years or so, while there is no chance of global nuclear disarmament (as distinct from a steady reduction of warhead numbers in the two biggest arsenals), the United Kingdom should persist with its own deterrent, but in the cheaper cruise-missile form. Unfortunately Lord Owen shows no sign of recognizing the enormity of the fact that any nuclear deterrence strategy entails the deterrer being willing intentionally to kill huge numbers of innocent people. True, he recognizes that even with very accurate cruise missiles, the actual use of the deterrent would inevitably kill many innocents. But perhaps to encourage widespread self-deception, he discusses this (like many other 'experts' do) in terms of 'counter-value' as distinct from 'counter-force' targeting (p. 52). Such euphemisms for mass-murder are perhaps necessary if the deterrer is to remain sane amidst the horrors. But not all the 'experts' have talked in this way. One exception was the late Sir Michael Quinlan, whom Lord Owen dubs 'the high priest of nuclear theory' (p. 295). Quinlan tried to show that the innocent killings the deterrer has to be willing to undertake are not intended. They would only be the side effects of what has to be done if deterrence fails. While this argument is fallacious, at least it shows that some of the 'experts' see that there are profound ethical difficulties with any deterrence strategy - something that Lord Owen does not discuss at any length in this book. Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 26:3, 235 - 246 Author InformationAuthor Website: http://isni.org/isni/0000000110736415Lord David Owen was a Member of Parliament for 26 years, serving as Navy Minister, Health Minister and Foreign Secretary. From 1992-95 Owen served as EU peace negotiator in the former Yugoslavia working alongside the UN appointed peace negotiator, Cyrus Vance. Together they co-authored the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. Tab Content 6Author Website: http://isni.org/isni/0000000110736415Countries AvailableAll regions |