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OverviewUses a game theoretic approach to explore which economic policies are 'credible' and 'politically feasible', questions that had eluded traditional macroeconomic approaches. Full Product DetailsAuthor: T. Persson , G. TabelliniPublisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd Imprint: Routledge Weight: 0.440kg ISBN: 9780415510967ISBN 10: 0415510961 Pages: 200 Publication Date: 29 November 2011 Audience: College/higher education , Tertiary & Higher Education Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print  This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of Contents1. Economic Policy as a Game 2. Committment versus Discretion in Monetary Policy 3. Reputation and Signalling 4. Election and Monetary Policy 5. Commitment versus Discretion in Wealth Taxation 6. Social Institutions and Credible Tax Policy 7. Credibility and Public Debt Management 8. The Political Economy of Government DebtReviews'This is an extremely useful book for those who want a thorough review of the subject.' - Thomas Havrilesky, Duke University, USA Author InformationTorsten Persson, Guido Tabellini, Jean-Michel Grandmont Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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