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An excerpt from the beginning of Part I. Latin Words Expressing Identity: IN this paper the word identity is used consistent with the practice of recent writers on logic, to describe not a single concept, but a group of related concepts, which on the one hand stand in close relationship to the concept of oneness, and on the other hand pass by very gradual transitional stages into those of difference and disparateness Of the three concepts that fall under the head of oneness, we are not immediately concerned with either the oneness of isolation illustrated by Plautus, Trin. 1114 Sed hic unus, ut ego suspicor, seruat fidem, or the oneness of unity exemplified in Celsus 7, 4, 4 (1. 14 D) linum .... duplex triplexve, sic tortum, ut unitas facta sit, but only with the third, the oneness of identity, since that coincides in part with the concept of sameness expressed by many of the words with which this paper deals. In general, identity is the consciousness that what have been conceived of as objects of two or more distinct acts of apperception have flowed together or fused more or less completely into one. This fusion is the result of the analysis and comparison of the two experiences, the mind measuring each by the standard of the other and determining what qualities are common to the two. The stage of the fusion, that is the degree of its completeness, depends upon the number and importance of the qualities or elements, which by the act of comparison are recognized as common to the two experiences. If the act of comparison establishes the identity of all the qualities of the two objects previously regarded as distinct, that is, not only the relatively permanent qualities, such as form, color, density, etc., but also what are ordinarily varying qualities, such as the activities and the location peculiar to the objects in space and time, the result is (1) complete or absolute identity, also called numerical identity. This is the form of identity that stands in closest relationship with the oneness of identity. The difference between them lies only in this, that in the latter the oneness resulting from the fusion of the experiences occupies a predominating place in the concept, while in the former the consciousness of their former (conceived) distinctness is clearer. But the act of comparison, while taking cognizance of all the elements of the two experiences, may establish the identity of only a part of them.' We then obtain some form of partial identity. It is evident that these forms are practically unlimited in number, varying as widely as the qualities themselves of the objects vary. It will be sufficient in this connection to call attention to a few of the more clearly marked forms, that result in part from comparison of certain groups of qualities, usually found in close association with each other in the normal mind. If, for example, the act of comparison establish the identity of all the qualities of the two or more experiences except their empirical definiteness, i. e. the specific position they occupy in the order of things, we obtain (2) specific identity, a form of partial identity illustrated by the English sentence The same plants grow in the same soil and climate everywhere; of Celsus, De medieina 4, 25 [18] (= p. 150, 1. 31 D) eaedem verbenae decoctae, 'twigs of the same species of plant.' It is clear that this form of identity would seldom occur as a result of the comparison of objects the individuality of which is strongly characterized. In such cases even though the qualities of the objects, for example, the persons, compared be recognized as identical, they will still be felt as in a sense distinct. Just such a case is found in Cicero, De amicitia 80 verus amicus .... est .... qui est tamquam alter idem, where the identity and distinctness respectively are expressed by idem and alter....

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