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OverviewOver the last quarter century, crisis bargaining has become the prevailing paradigm for the study of war. This textbook presents a concise and approachable overview of the crisis bargaining literature, surveying the canonical formal models in the bargaining approach to war. It begins by considering different explanations for war, then delves into two classes of explanation: commitment problems and incomplete information. This textbook is essential reading for advanced undergraduates, graduates, and researchers alike. Each chapter delves into a specific part of the puzzle, rigorously unravelling the twisted logic that causes wars to begin. More than seventy illuminating figures illustrate the strategic reasoning outlined and more than 100 exercises of graded levels of difficulty help clarify readers' own understanding of the issues. Online resources include an instructor answer key and numerous engaging video lectures. Full Product DetailsAuthor: William Spaniel (University of Pittsburgh)Publisher: Cambridge University Press Imprint: Cambridge University Press Weight: 0.701kg ISBN: 9781009318532ISBN 10: 1009318535 Pages: 300 Publication Date: 09 November 2023 Audience: General/trade , General Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: Manufactured on demand We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier. Table of Contents1. Introduction: why war? Part I. Complete Information Models: 2. War's inefficiency puzzle; 3. Power and commitment problems; 4. Preventive war and bargaining over power; 5. Hidden commitment problems; Part II. Incomplete Information Models: 6. Uncertainty over costs; 7. Uncertainty over power; 8. Cheap talk and incentives to misrepresent; 9. Military mobilizations and costly signals; 10. Manipulating the peace premium; 11. Mechanism design; 12. Fighting and learning; Part III. Appendices: 13. Discounting; 14. Derivatives of implicit functions; 15. Mechanism design primer.Reviews'Textbook, yes, but at the same time a creative, well organized, and clearly written synthesis and presentation of around 30 years of thinking about paths into armed conflict in terms of bargaining models. Spaniel's book pulls this part of the field together in a highly useful way, adding valuable clarifications and insights throughout. Excellent both as an efficient introduction and a jumping off point for next steps.' James Fearon, Stanford University, California 'In the face of the obvious cost, in terms of both economic loss and human suffering, the fact that war occurs at all is puzzling. For the last 20 years, scholars of international relations have developed a useful and rigorous framework for understanding the factors that prevent countries from reaching peaceful settlements to their disputes. In Formal Models of Crisis Bargaining: Applications in the Politics of Conflict, Spaniel skillfully elucidates the contemporary scholarly understanding of war's origins in a remarkably accessible manner. He adeptly introduces the reader to modern strategic analysis of conflict, employing clear prose and presenting numerous real-world applications. Everyone from undergraduate political science majors to research scholars will find value in this ambitious and necessary book.' Kristopher W. Ramsay, Princeton University, New Jersey 'Spaniel's textbook is truly impressive, covering a wide range of technical material with both accessibility and depth and giving structure to a rapidly growing modeling enterprise at the center of the modern theory of war. It'll be a staple of my graduate teaching from here on.' Scott Wolford, University of Texas, Austin 'For almost three decades, scholars have been studying conflict and violence using the verbal and mathematical language of bargaining without a guide. With deep knowledge of this work, Spaniel standardizes diverse models and presents a compelling and accessible story as to how to understand war and peace. This will be an essential reference for all students of conflict.' Emily Ritter, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee 'The book is an outstanding treatment of the formal literature on international conflict that has developed in the last three decades. The chapters are clear and concise, and cover a broad range of important topics, including commitment problems, the role of uncertainty, costly signalling and cheap talk, and mechanism design. Readers will gain valuable insight into the role of formal models in understanding crisis bargaining and war.' Mark Fey, University of Rochester, New York Author InformationWilliam Spaniel's research focuses on interstate conflict, nuclear weapons, and terrorism. He uses game theoretical models to develop new insights on these phenomenon. He received a PhD in political science from the University of Rochester in 2015. Before arriving at the University of Pittsburgh, he was a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. He has authored many books, including Bargaining over the Bomb, and coauthored Militant Competition, both published by Cambridge University Press. His YouTube channel covers current affairs in international relations and receives millions of views each month. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |