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OverviewBased on extensive research in government archives and private papers, this book analyzes the secret debate within the Eisenhower administration over the pursuit of a nuclear test-ban agreement. In contrast to much recent scholarship, this study concludes that Eisenhower strongly desired to reach an accord with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to cease nuclear weapons testing. For Eisenhower, a test ban would ease Cold War tensions, slow the nuclear arms race, and build confidence toward disarmament; however, he faced continual resistance from his early scientific advisers, most notably Lewis L. Strauss and Edward Teller. Extensive research into previously unavailable government archival sources and collections of private manuscripts reveals the manipulative acts of test-ban opponents and other factors that inhibited Eisenhower's actions throughout his presidency. Meticulously analyzed, these sources underscore Eisenhower's dependence on the counsel of his science advisors, such as Strauss, James R. Killian, and George B. Kistiakowsky, to determine the course he pursued in regard to several components of his national security strategy. In addition to its comprehensive analysis of the test-ban debate, this book makes important contributions to the scholarly literature assessing Eisenhower's leadership and his approach to arms control. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Benjamin P. GreenePublisher: Stanford University Press Imprint: Stanford University Press Dimensions: Width: 15.20cm , Height: 1.10cm , Length: 22.90cm Weight: 0.454kg ISBN: 9780804754453ISBN 10: 0804754454 Pages: 376 Publication Date: 23 October 2006 Audience: College/higher education , Professional and scholarly , Undergraduate , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print  This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of ContentsTable of Contents Preface Abbreviations Introduction Chapter One: Eisenhower and the Atomic Age (1945-1952) Chapter Two: The Dawn of the Thermonuclear Age (1953) Chapter Three: The BRAVO Shot and Rise of the Test-Ban Debate within the International and Scientific Communities (1954-1955) Chapter Four: Fallout from the BRAVO Shot: The Test-Ban Debate within the Eisenhower Administration (1954-1955) Chapter Five: The Election of 1956: A Moratorium on Candor Chapter Six: The Influence of Strauss, the Fall of Stassen, and the Rise of Sputnik (November 1956 - October 1957) Chapter Seven: PSAC, the Test Moratorium, and the Geneva System (October 1957 - August 1958) Chapter Eight: Hard Decisions after HARDTACK II: Stalemate at Geneva (August 1958 - December 1959) Chapter Nine: The Threshold Ban, the Paris Summit, and the Farewell Address (December 1959 - January 1961) Epilogue Conclusion Notes Sources Index ReviewsBenjamin P. Greene's monograph is an exemplary study of the interaction of geopolitics, bureaucratic maneuvering, and scientific claims during the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration The careful research and important arguments of Greene's monograph make it essential reading for historians interested in the Cold War, arms control, nuclear decision making, and the history of science policy. -- American Historical Review Greene offers an intriguing argument to explain why the president failed [to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty with the USSR]. His book is carefully crafted, it is methodologically sound, and it makes a genuine contribution to scholarship on the politics of science and technology in the cold war. Greene's conclusions, however, are bound to be controversial because of what they say not only about science advice but about Eisenhower's control over his own administration. -- Technology and Culture Author InformationBenjamin Greene is Assistant Professor of History at Bowling Green State University in Ohio. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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