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OverviewMost observers who follow nuclear history agree on one major aspect regarding Israel's famous policy of nuclear ambiguity; mainly that it is an exception. More specifically, it is largely accepted that the 1969 Nixon-Meir understanding, which formally established Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity and transformed it from an undeclared Israeli strategy into a long-lasting undisclosed bilateral agreement, was in fact a singularity, aimed at allowing Washington to turn a blind eye to the existence of an Israeli arsenal. According to conventional wisdom, this nuclear bargain was a foreign policy exception on behalf of Washington, an exception which reflected a relationship growing closer and warmer between the superpower leading the free world and its small Cold War associate. Contrary to the orthodox narrative, this research demonstrates that this was not the case. The 1969 bargain was not, in fact, an exception, but rather the first of three Cold War era deals on nuclear tests brokered by Washington with its Cold War associates, the other two being Pakistan and South Africa. These two deals are not well known and until now were discussed and explored in the literature in a very limited fashion. Bargaining on Nuclear Tests places the role of nuclear tests by American associates, as well as Washington's attempts to prevent and delay them, at the heart of a new nuclear history narrative. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Or Rabinowitz (Research Associate, Research Associate, Centre for Science and Security Studies, King's College London)Publisher: Oxford University Press Imprint: Oxford University Press Dimensions: Width: 16.30cm , Height: 2.20cm , Length: 23.90cm Weight: 0.534kg ISBN: 9780198702931ISBN 10: 0198702930 Pages: 246 Publication Date: 01 May 2014 Audience: College/higher education , Professional and scholarly , Undergraduate , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order  Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of Contents1: Introduction 2: The Paradox of Hegemony 3: The NPT, Nuclear Tests and Their Changing Legal Status 4: The American Test Ban Debate 5: Israel 6: South Africa 7: Pakistan 8: India 9: ConclusionsReviewsRabinowitz makes a strong case that the United States, as a last resort in dealing with nuclear proliferation, sought to bargain with Israel, Pakistan and South Africa to convince them not to test a nuclear weapon in response for backing off efforts to stop and roll back their nuclear programs. He provides some interesting information on the development of these three and the Indian nuclear effort and raises questions about whether and how the bargains were kept or broken on each aside. An interesting read, especially for nuclear policy buffs. Thomas R Pickering, former US Under Secretary of State, Ambassador to Israel, Russia, India and the UN Author InformationOr (Ori) Rabinowitz, an Israeli Chevening Scholar, is a research associate at the Centre for Science and Security Studies, King's College London (KCL). She holds a PhD degree awarded by the War Studies Department of KCL, an MA degree in Security Studies and an LLB degree in Law, both from Tel-Aviv University. Dr Rabinowitz has worked as a news desk editor on Israel's 'Channel 10' news, Ma'ariv newspaper and the IDF radio station 'Galey Zahal', and at the press office of the Israeli embassy in London. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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