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Overview"Since the beginning of the 20th century, the United States has sought to achieve Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's vision of ""command of the sea"" using large battle fleets of capital ships. This strategy has been generally successful: no force can oppose the U.S. Navy on the open seas. Yet capital ship theory has become increasingly irrelevant. Globally, irregular warfare dominates the spectrum of conflict, especially in the aftermath of 9/11. Fleet engagements are a thing of the past and even small scale missions that rely on capital ships are challenged by irregular warfare. In a pattern evident since World War II, the U.S. Navy has attempted to adapt its capital ship theory to irregular conflicts--with mixed results--before returning to traditional operations with little or no strategic debate. This book discusses the challenges of irregular warfare in the 21st century, and the need for U.S. naval power to develop a new strategic paradigm." Full Product DetailsAuthor: R.B. WattsPublisher: McFarland & Co Inc Imprint: McFarland & Co Inc Dimensions: Width: 15.20cm , Height: 1.20cm , Length: 22.90cm Weight: 0.322kg ISBN: 9780786498796ISBN 10: 078649879 Pages: 232 Publication Date: 27 November 2015 Recommended Age: From 18 years Audience: College/higher education , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In stock  We have confirmation that this item is in stock with the supplier. It will be ordered in for you and dispatched immediately. Table of ContentsTable of Contents Acknowledgments Preface Introduction One. The Changing Paradigm of War: The United States and Irregular Warfare Theory Two. The Philosophy: A.T. Mahan and the Foundations of U.S. Naval Thought Three. War Fighting Theory and Practice, 1914–1941: The Ascendancy of the Capital Ship Four. Lessons, Retrenchment, and Theory, 1945–1951 Five. Theory and the Challenge of Irregular Warfare, 1950–1980 Six. Theoretical Renaissance: The Maritime Strategy, 1980–1990 Seven. Strategy Adrift, 1990–2001 Eight. The New Challenge: 9/11 and the Use of Naval Power in Irregular Warfare Nine. The Legacy Lives On Conclusions—The Cycles of History Chapter Notes Bibliography IndexReviewsWatts does an admirable job of covering the historical basis for his theory...a noteworthy entry into an area that is rarely explored...meticulous research...a worthwhile read --<i>Center for International Maritime Security</i>. “Watts does an admirable job of covering the historical basis for his theory...a noteworthy entry into an area that is rarely explored...meticulous research...a worthwhile read”—Center for International Maritime Security. Author InformationDr. R.B. Watts is a retired Coast Guard captain who has written extensively on sea power and contingencies in USNI Proceedings, the Naval War College Review and other professional journals and most recently served as the Coast Guard Chief of Contingency Planning and Exercises before retiring to take a professorship at the National War College, where he teaches courses in war and statecraft, domestic policy, homeland security, military history, and irregular warfare. He lives in Washington D.C. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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